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Abstract
The role of domestic courts in the application of international law is one of the most vividly
debated issues in contemporary international legal doctrine. However, the methodology of
interpretation of international norms used by these courts remains underexplored. In particu-
lar, the application of the Vienna rules of treaty interpretation by domestic courts has not
been sufficiently assessed so far. Three case studies (from the US Supreme Court, the Mexican
Supreme Court, and the European Court of Justice) show the diversity of approaches in this
respect. In the light of these case studies, the article explores the inevitable tensions between
two opposite, yet equally legitimate, normative expectations: the desirability of a common,
predictable methodology versus the need for flexibility in adapting international norms to a
plurality of domestic environments.
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1. INTRODUCTION
International lawyers traditionallyharbouredacertaindegreeof scepticismtowards
the application of international law by domestic courts. It was suspected that their
leanings were overly nationalistic, that they broadly construed norms that served
theirparticularcountry’s interestandinterpretedrestrictivelylessfavourablenorms.
Moreover, it was noted that national courts tended to yield to the executive branch
when it came to international affairs, trying to keep themselves out of a field they
perceived as unsuitable for judicial decision-making. ‘Avoidance canons’ referred
either to a bundle of judicial techniques designed to prevent a court’s engagement
in the pitfalls of international relations (such as the political-question doctrine), or
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to general concepts applied to this effect (such as rigid interpretations of standing
requirements).1
Meanwhile, it is a well-observed tendency for national courts to increasingly
abandon their traditional deference to the executive branch with respect to the
determination and interpretation of international law. At the same time, they seem
to bemore eager to decide questions of international law on themerits: their classic
avoidance techniques are less frequently applied.2 The explanations offered for the
increased eagerness of municipal courts to deal with matters of international law
vary. Some allege that national courts try to bolster their institutional position vis-
a`-vis the executive, in a time when the advance of globalization threatens to divest
them of many fields of activity formerly dealt with at the national level.3 Others
submit that domestic courts seem to regard themselves more and more as ‘agents
of the international community’ when applying international law. In this context,
Georges Scelle’s notion of de´doublement fonctionnel4 has received attention again.5
The position of domestic courts in the international legal process can be com-
pared to that of Goldoni’s ‘servant of two masters’: whereas their legitimacy stems
from domestic sources, most often the constitution and laws enacted in accordance
with it, some of themalso try to accommodate the commands and restrictions inter-
national law places upon them.6 With their judgments, they have to appeal to both
domestic and international audiences. It is not surprising that this situation has
led to considerable academic interest.7 Curiously, though, this widespread interest
focuses mainly on the institutional ramifications of the use of international law
by domestic courts – their function and authority as a counterweight to the other
branches of government, their relationships with other domestic courts and inter-
national bodies of adjudication, their motivations and strategies, and related issues.
A cognate question, one of great theoretical as well as practical import, has received
1 E. Benvenisti, ‘Judicial Misgivings Regarding the Application of International Law: An Analysis of Attitudes
of National Courts’, (1993) 4 EJIL 159, at 169.
2 E. Benvenisti, ‘Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign and International Law by Domestic
Courts’, (2008) 102 AJIL 241, at 242.
3 A.-M. Slaughter, ‘A Global Community of Courts’, (2003) 44 Harvard International Law Journal 191, at 192;
E. Benvenisti and G. W. Downs, ‘National Courts, Domestic Democracy, and the Evolution of International
Law’, (2009) 20 EJIL 59, at 60–1.
4 G. Scelle, Pre´cis de droit des gens: Principes et syste´matique, Vol. 2 (1934), at 10–12.
5 Y. Shany, ‘“De´doublement fonctionnel” and the Mixed Loyalties of National and International Judges’, in F.
Fontanelli (ed.), Shaping Rule of Law through dialogue (2010), 28 at 40.
6 As is evident from thewidespread use of the technique of ‘consistent interpretation’: see A. Cassese, ‘Modern
Constitutions and International Law’, (1985) 192 RdC 331; G. Betlem and A. Nollkaemper, ‘Giving Effect to
Public International Law and European Community Law before Domestic Courts: A Comparative Analysis
of the Practice of Consistent Interpretation’, (2003) 14 EJIL 569.
7 See Benvenisti andDowns, supranote 3; F. Francioni, ‘International Law as aCommonLanguage forNational
Courts’, (2001) 36 Texas International Law Journal 587; K. Knop, ‘Here and There: International Law in
Domestic Courts’, (2000) 32New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 501; K. Parrot-Gilbert,
‘La jurisprudence interne, “source” de droit international conventionnel? A propos de L’application des
conventions portant “loi uniforme”’, (2009) 113 RGDIP 19; A. Roberts, ‘Comparative International Law? The
Role of National Courts in Creating and Enforcing International Law’, (2011) 60 ICLQ 57; A. Nollkaemper,
National Courts and the International Rule of Law (2011); J. d’Aspremont, ‘The Systemic Integration of Inter-
national Law by Domestic Courts: Domestic Judges as Architects of the Consistency of the International
Legal Order’, in O. K. Fauchald and A. Nollkaemper (eds.), The Practice of International and National Courts and
the (De-)Fragmentation of International Law (2012), 141.
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considerably less attention: how do national courts apply international law? How
do they interpret it?8
The growing use of international law by domestic courts is usually hailed as a
positive trend, providing effective means of enforcement and strengthening the
international rule of law. Yet, the growing engagement of national judges in
the interpretation of international law may also have an impact on the structure
of the international legal system. Several effects of this trend are conceivable. In
this article, we assess these potential effects in the light of four recurring themes:
first, it needs to be identified whether domestic courts are aware of the existence
of a distinct hermeneutical framework when they decide cases pertaining to ques-
tions of international law. In other words: do they acknowledge that international
law provides for specific rules of interpretation? We will show that despite a gen-
eral awareness of these distinct methods of interpretation, the practice of domestic
courts is characterized by considerable diversity in this regard. This leads, second, to
the question whether this diversity of domestic legal methodologies might lead to
a further fragmentation of international law. A related concern is, third, that influ-
ential courts (whether due to their juridical distinction or the political importance
of their country) might rush ahead with a particularly ‘progressive’ interpretation
of an international norm, thus giving rise to a new kind of unilateralism, a form of
‘judicial imperialism’.9 Finally, these questions refer back to Scelle’s de´doublement:
courts that feel boundby loyalty to the international communitymight conceivably
be more inclined to reflect on questions of methodology when construing a treaty.
In our analysis, we will proceed in three steps. In the first, we will present the
normative framework within which our research question is located, i.e. the nor-
mativeandconceptualenvironmentwherethe interpretationof international treaty
lawby domestic judges takes place. This provides the analytical background against
whichwe can present, in the second step, the case law of three jurisdictionswe have
selected as case studies: the European Union, Mexico, and the United States. It will
become apparent that there is considerable variance in the way in which domestic
courts approach the issue of treaty interpretation. In a third step, we will then turn
to the four recurrent themes we have just identified. Their discussion will provide
the ground for somebrief conclusions. In all this, it is not our intention to commend
a set of correct rules of interpretation and then provide cherry-picked judgments
in support of our approach; in fact, we are less concerned with particular rules and
their merits than with the general importance of hermeneutical awareness in a
decentralized and diverging system of social order. As the three case studies will
show, the role of courts within their specific social and political contexts, i.e. their
institutional environment, has also to be considered as a ‘broader dimension’10 of
thishermeneutical awareness.Attentionwill thusbepaid tohowthe self-perception
8 One of themost comprehensive studies on this issue is still C. H. Schreuer, ‘The Interpretation of Treaties by
Domestic Courts’, (1971) 45 BYIL 255.
9 For the position that influential courts should go ahead see Roberts, supra note 7.
10 See further M. Poiares Maduro, ‘Courts and Pluralism: Essay on a Theory of Judicial Adjudication in the
Context of Legal and Constitutional Pluralism’, in J. L. Dunoff and J. P. Trachtman (eds.), Ruling the World?
Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance (2009), 356 at 359.
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of domestic courts within their national, regional, and international realms affects
their interpretative practices.
2. LEGAL PLURALISM AND THE RULE OF LAW: WHY
INTERPRETATION MATTERS
2.1. The indeterminacy controversy
It is almost a thought-terminating cliche´ today that rules of interpretation have
little if any effect on the outcomeof a particular case. AsHersch Lauterpachwrote in
1949, ‘as a rule they are not the determining cause of judicial decision, but the form
inwhich the judge cloaks a result arrived at by othermeans’.11 Amore fundamental
critiquehas been that the indeterminacyof languagemakes it impossible to base the
decision of a concrete case on the abstract words of a legal rule.12 From this alleged
indeterminacy itwas inferred that interpretation is just the suppressionof an inevit-
able ambiguity, with legal hermeneutics being ‘a set of hegemonicmoves thatmake
particular arguments or preferences seem something other than particular because
they seem, for example “coherent” with the “principles” of the legal system’.13 In
a weaker form, these doubts on the usefulness of methodology are reflected in the
truism that interpretation is ‘an art, not an exact science’.14
While these critical insights stress important limits to the rules of interpretation,
it still appears that judicial and societal practice largely upholds the assumption
that there is some determinacy in law and that it is ultimately possible to arrive at
a common understanding of a norm. When courts decide cases and thereby settle
disputes for the parties, they rely on the fiction that there are legal reasons which
justify a certain result. Courts can bemore or less persuasive in the giving of reasons,
but it is important that they do so, in order for the participants in the legal pro-
cess to understand why a particular decision has been reached, and not a different
one.15 The social practice of recognizing this process as something useful to society
gives the fiction its practical relevance.16 The rules of interpretation help to narrow
the scope of admissible arguments.17 Even Koskenniemi admits that an important
task of international lawyers is to determine which arguments can plausibly be ad-
vanced in the legal discourse andwhich are unsusceptible to acceptance by the legal
11 H. Lauterpacht, ‘Restrictive Interpretation and thePrinciple of Effectiveness in the InterpretationofTreaties’,
(1949) 26 BYIL 48, at 53.
12 On the debate and its flaws see L. Solum, ‘On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma’, (1987) 54
University of Chicago Law Review 462.
13 M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia (2005 reissue), 597.
14 Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1966, Vol. 2), 218, para 4. On this saying, see also J.-M. Sorel
and V. Bore´ Eveno, ‘Article 31’, in O. Corten and P. Klein (eds.), The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(2011), Art. 31, para. 12.
15 On the importance of giving reasons, see B. Kingsbury, ‘International Law as Inter-Public Law’, in H. S.
Richardson andM. S.Williams,Moral Universalism and Pluralism (2009), 178, at 180.
16 On meaning as a social construct in the interpretation of international law, see A. Bianchi, ‘Textual Inter-
pretation and (International) Law Reading: TheMyth of (In)Determinacy and the Genealogy ofMeaning’, in
P. H. F. Bekker, R. Dolzer, and M. Waibel (eds.),Making Transnational LawWork in the Global Economy: Essays
in Honour of Detlev Vagts (2010), 34.
17 Cf. O. M. Fiss, ‘Objectivity and Interpretation’, (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 739, at 744.
UNITY OR UNIFORMITY? 79
community.18 For the decentralized international legal system, the question is what
importance needs to be ascribed to the international rules of interpretation by do-
mestic courts. Behind this question lies the even bigger one of how this legal system
shall be understood: is it premised on an all-encompassing uniformity of inter-
pretation, i.e. the goal that all relevant actors are supposed to interpret inter-
national obligations in exactly the same way? Or is it sufficient that the inter-
national legal system is held together by some common rules which ensure
systemic unity at a general level, but allow for deviation and pluralism in specific
situations?
2.2. Rules of interpretation and the rule of law
In every legal system, rules of interpretation play a fundamental role in the ad-
ministration of justice, as they govern the primary activity of the judge and the
construction of the law, and ultimately help determine the result.19 However, ques-
tions ofmethodology rarely attractmuch public attention,20 since it is the outcome
of a case that is ultimately assessed, not the way the judges reached it. Nevertheless,
these so-called ‘secondary norms’21 (as opposed to the primary norms towhich they
are applied) serve a number of important purposes.
First, they guarantee the autonomy of the legal system, whose claim to an inde-
pendent existence depends on the fact that it works in a different way than other
(sub)systemsof society (suchas thepolitical or theeconomic spheres); decidesunder
adifferentprocedure; and,most importantly, is confined toa limitednumberofways
inwhichargumentsmaybeadvanced,wayswhicharepredefinedandoriginate from
within the system itself. Only under these conditions can the idea be maintained
that the interpretation of law by a judge is guided by objective, neutral principles,
ideally leading to a convincing result that is able to pacify the controversy. Second,
rules of interpretation can promote stability and reliability in a legal system, make
the courts’ actions more predictable, and thereby strengthen the confidence of all
relevant social actors that their legitimate expectations will not be disappointed.
Thus, they have a direct bearing on the authority and respect that a system of law –
and its representatives – enjoy. Finally, secondary norms, such as the rules of inter-
pretation, protect the unity and integrity of the legal system: they resolve conflicts
between different primary norms, provide methods to fill gaps in the legal fabric,
and limit the exercise of judicial power, by setting limits to interpretative discretion.
Although the work of the judge may have an inherent tendency towards arbitrari-
ness, at least the possibility of excess is limited by a duty to justify the result in terms
of methodology.22
18 Koskenniemi, supra note 13, at 11.
19 A. Barak, The Judge in a Democracy (2006), 133.
20 An exception to this observation is the debate over the proper method of interpreting the US Constitution,
leading to quarrels in the federal judiciary between ‘originalists’ and proponents of the idea of a ‘living’
constitution.
21 H. L. A.Hart,TheConcept of Law (1994), at 94–9; on secondary rules in international law see furtherNollkaem-
per, supra note 7, at 224–6.
22 In a sense, rules of interpretation help prevent the excesses of judicial activism by recalling that case law too
has to be able to speak on behalf of the whole society and to society as a whole, cf. Kingsbury, supra note 15.
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Thesegeneralobservations regarding the importanceof secondarynorms inshap-
ing and structuring legal systems are of particular relevance in a non-hierarchical
system like international law where the way to achieve autonomy, integrity, and
coherence seems much longer and more tedious. With respect to the judicial ap-
plication of international law, one difference between international and domestic
tribunals deservesmentioning: whereas international judges, though of various na-
tional origins, usually belong to the proverbial ‘invisible college of international
lawyers’,23 national judges from different jurisdictions share far fewer similarities
in mindset, education, and their perception of the judicial role.
It is therefore not surprising that international law today can look back on a
rich, distinct doctrinal history of treaty interpretation. A direct line can be drawn
from the Graeco-Roman approaches to legal arguments, the constitutiones legitimae,
to Gentili, Grotius, Vattel, and Pufendorf, all of whom devoted significant efforts to
the development of rules on treaty interpretation, recognizing the importance of
having a universal methodology independent of individual states’ will.24 The rules
formulated by these founding fathers of international law, a mixture of abstract
logicalmaxims, concrete legal principles, and natural-law concepts like ‘good faith’,
essentially remained the canon of interpretation that was applied by courts and
restated in textbooks until the middle of the twentieth century.25
Building on these previous achievements, the UN’s International Law Commis-
sion (ILC) adopted in 1966 their Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, most of which
found their way into the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) of 1969.
The rules of interpretation, contained in Articles 31–3 VCLT, have since then been
critically discussed and are by now widely accepted as reflecting customary inter-
national law.26 Theygivepreference toobjectiveover subjective interpretation,with
Article 31 making a treaty’s text the main source of its construction.27 This text-
ualism, somewhat mitigated by the fact that Article 31 permits resort to context
and subsequent practice, has been the primary cause of criticism levelled against
the Vienna rules; proponents of a subjectivemethod, focusing on the parties’ intent,
labelled it ‘the grossest exercise of arbitrary formalism’.28 In this question, as well as
in the restriction Article 32 puts on the use of travaux pre´paratoires, the VCLT rules
are at variancewith some long-standingdomestic traditions of treaty interpretation;
23 O. Schachter, ‘The Invisible College of International Lawyers’, (1977) 72Northwestern University Law Review
217.
24 For this history see D. J. Bederman, Classical Canons: Rhetoric, Classicism and Treaty Interpretation (2001).
25 Lauterpacht, supra note 11, at 50.
26 See Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), Judgment of
31 March 2004, [2004] ICJ Rep. 12, at 48, para. 83; Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau
Sipadan (Indonesia v. Malaysia), Judgment of 17 December 2002, [2002] ICJ Rep. 625, at 645, para. 37, with
further references; Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v. Namibia), Judgment of 13 December
1999, [1999] ICJ. Rep. 1045, at 1059, para. 18; Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v. Hon-
duras; Nicaragua Intervening), Judgment of 1 September 1992, [1992] ICJ Rep. 351, at 586, para. 380; see also
Art. 2(2)(b) of the Resolution of the Institut de droit international on ‘L’interpre´tation des traite´s’, (1956)
Annuaire IDI 359.
27 According to some, however, the general rule of interpretation embodies a compromise between objective
and subjective schools of treaty interpretation; see R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (2008), at 8.
28 M. S. McDougal, H. Laswell, and J. Miller, The Interpretation of Agreement andWorld Public Order (1994), xvii.
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the practice of courts in the United States is the best-known example.29 Neverthe-
less, just as any norm, the VCLT rules are subject to interpretation; and arguably the
holistic approach of Article 31 includes all major schools of interpretation, namely
textualism (‘ordinarymeaning’), teleology (‘object and purpose’) and, less explicitly,
intentionalism (‘good faith’).
As argued above, rules of interpretation are indispensable for any advanced legal
order. When it comes to national courts, the question is: is it desirable that they all
apply the same rules of interpretation when construing international treaties? Or
could it be a productive form of cross-fertilization to introduce different national
methodologies to the international legal process, thereby eventually enriching the
international practice? This could be of particular value as also international courts
ofgeneral jurisdiction,mostnotably the ICJ,havenotyet framedaconsistent scheme
of interpretation.30
2.3. The challenge of pluralism
From the perspective of the international legal system, it appears as if there is an
expectation of the highest possible degree of coherence in the practice of domestic
courts.Withrespect tomanyinternationalagreements, it is indeedthemainpurpose
to ensure uniformity of rules and behaviour among the parties. To reach this goal,
it does not suffice to adopt a single authoritative text – uniform application of the
agreed rules is required. This is quite undisputed in the case of treaties with a rather
technical content, such as the Warsaw or the Montreal Conventions – evidently, it
is not feasible to have different interpretations of the rules of civil aviation applied
in every member state.
Quite differently, regional human rights instruments may only set forth min-
imum standards which are subsidiary to the protection of fundamental rights in
national legal systems. Here, consistency in interpretation can only be a legitimate
goal in so far as the minimum standard must be met by all state parties to the re-
spective regime. Arguably, it is not illegitimate to devise new interpreativemethods
whichhelp to gobeyondwhat is required by the treaty if this does not lead to deficits
in rights protection for other involved actors.31
Yet, the challenge described here goes clearly beyond specific problems of cer-
tain treaty regimes, and concerns the broader argument that strict consistency and
coherence of the whole system of international law may not be desirable in the
first place. It could be argued that such uniformity might stand in the way of legal
development and that it might help to protect conservative structures upon which
self-interested states have agreed. In times inwhich someauthors describe our inter-
national – or rather global – legal system inpluralist terms, itmight be reasonable to
29 See, e.g., D. Vagts, ‘Treaty Interpretation and the New American Way of Law Reading’, (1993) 4 EJIL 472, at
491.
30 Cf. E. S. Yambrusic, Treaty Interpretation (1987), 144. See also S. Torres Berna´rdez, ‘Interpretation of Treaties
by the International Court of Justice Following the Adoption of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties’, in G. Hafner et al. (eds.), Liber Amicorum Professor Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern in Honour of His 80th
Birthday (1998), 721, at 747.
31 See F. G. Jacobs, ‘Introduction’, in F. G. Jacobs and S. Roberts (eds.), The Effect of Treaties in Domestic Law (1987),
xxiii, at xxxi, note 25.
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assume that different legal cultures and forms of education will necessarily impact
on theway courts reason on questions of international law. Shouldwe not rather, in
the light of these considerations, recognize domestic courts as actors who translate
requirements from international law into domestic terminology,32 and thus help to
increase the legitimacy of international law? Already in 1964, Richard Falk argued
that
the role of domestic courts relates to the increasing participation in world affairs
of nations with diverse normative traditions. It is generally acknowledged that inter-
national law–as adynamic system– suffers from itshistorical attachment toEuropean
culture. If law is to bring increasing stability to international relations, then it must
progressively liberate itself from its somewhat provincial past. This requires a respect
for diversity more than an agreement upon universal standards.33
However, there is an inherent tension in this remark. Falk pleads for diversity, but
with stability in mind. These dialectics point towards the reason why we stress the
importanceof relativeunity in thedomainofmethodand,morebroadly speaking, in
the realm of secondary rules. We maintain that challenges to an overly demanding
conceptionofuniformity canbe reconciledwithcoherenceon the level of secondary
rules. The secondary rules are what defines a legal system. They help to build and to
maintain its integrity.34 For this integrity toexist, at leastacertain levelofpredictabil-
ity is necessary, and this iswhat secondary rules are about. At the same time, this pre-
dictability enables agreement within diversity. By contributing to a more objective
articulation of national courts’ normative preferences regarding international law
questions, the recognized criteria for interpretation facilitate dialogue and, ultim-
ately, the possibilities of agreement among them.35 The rules of interpretation are
an important part of such a common frame of reference.
This is recognized by some adherents of (constitutional) pluralism. Neil Mac-
Cormick, for instance, argued for a pluralism of legal systems ‘ordered under inter-
national law’.36 When describing the ‘pluralist constellation in global governance’,
Daniel Halberstam emphasizes the importance of ‘general rules governing the cre-
ation, modification and interpretation of treaties’.37 As can be expected given the
varying forms of pluralist approaches to international and transnational law,38 not
all pluralists would agree. The position of Halberstammay show, however, that the
argument for a certain level of coherence in the field of secondary rules and, more
particularly, the rules governing the interpretation of international law need not be
associated with hierarchical, top-downmodels of global governance.
32 See Knop, supra note 7.
33 R. Falk, The Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order (1964), at 66.
34 See Hart, supra note 21.
35 Cf. Poiares Maduro, supra note 10, at 359–61.
36 N. MacCormick, ‘Risking Constitutional Collision in Europe?’, (1998) 18 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 517,
at 527 et seq.; see further the conversation between Weiler and Halberstam in J. H. H. Weiler, ‘Dialogical
Epiloque’, in G. de Bu´rca and J. H. H.Weiler (eds.), TheWorlds of European Constitutionalism (2012), 262 at 288.
37 Daniel Halberstam, ‘Local, Global and Plural Constitutionalism: Europe Meets the World’, in de Bu´rca and
Weiler, supra note 36, 113, at 167.
38 See N. Krisch, ‘The Case for Pluralism in Postnational Law’, in de Bu´rca andWeiler, supra note 36, 203 at 220.
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Articles 31–3 VLCT may just serve the purpose of contributing to a common
foundation for judicial dialogue in a pluralist environment. In this regard, what is
frequently viewed as a deficit of these rules may turn into a particular strength:
the rules of interpretation themselves are open-textured. Hence, they leave room
for assimilation by national courts, which is often required by domestic audiences,
while, at the same time, they provide for important clarifications, which facilitate
the connection with the external audiences, and the co-ordination amongst them.
This is of particular importance in aworldwhere the internal/external divide is ever
more questioned. The rules of interpretation contribute to these connections and
reconnections by specifying the sources thatmay be looked at to discern the shared
intent of the parties, the ultimate goal of treaty interpretation. The outstanding im-
portance of the treaty’s text as a whole is stressed, but rigid literalism is discouraged
by the reference to object andpurpose. In enumerating the sourceswhich constitute
the ‘context’, the Vienna Convention alerts the interpreter to an important issue:
the different forms in which the parties can at any time express their agreement
on a particular (authoritative) interpretation. Especially the most informal mode,
provided for inArticle 31(3)(b) (‘subsequent practice . . . which establishes the agree-
ment of the parties’), can prove to be challenging for domestic judges, although it
is a common usage in domestic contract law to look at the parties’ later conduct to
divine the meaning of an earlier agreement.39
Altogether, the rules of interpretation should not be conceived as a precise
guideline that judges can follow blindly to reach a cogent result.40 They tell the
judges what they should look at, but leave it to their discretionwhich glasses to put
on. Moreover, they do not contain any of the classic default rules such as restrictive
interpretation (in ambiguous cases, limitations on a state’s sovereignty cannot be
presumed)or effective interpretation (anormmustbe construed tohave thegreatest
possible effect towards its aim), although the latter principle can be read as implied
in the phrase ‘object and purpose’. The Vienna rules do not put to rest all doubts and
uncertainties, nor do they reveal the true meaning; and one should not be tempted
by the alleged textualismof Article 31 to ‘make a fortress out of the dictionary’.41 An
international treaty, more than any other legal instrument, cannot be understood
through mechanical adherence to a doctrine, nor through thoughtless processing
of a hierarchical scheme.
In this context, it should also be noted that it can be verymuch in the self-interest
of domestic courts to apply the international rules of interpretation. Adopting an
international-law orientated methodology signals the aspiration of the domestic
court to apply international law faithfully. Recourse to the international rules of
interpretation will not guarantee a certain outcome of the case. But the application
39 A. Glashausser, ‘What We Must Never Forget When It Is a Treaty We Are Expounding’, (2005) 73 University
of Cincinnati Law Review 1243, at 1335. On subsequent practice in international law, see the contributions in
G. Nolte (ed.), Treaties and Subsequent Practice (2013).
40 Gardiner, supra note 27, 7.
41 In the words of Judge Learned Hand, who famously observed in Cabell v. Markham,148 F.2d 737, 739 (1942):
‘[I]t is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of
the dictionary’; but see for a different view A. Orakhelashvili, The Interpretation of Acts and Rules in Public
International Law (2008), 309.
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of domestic canons of statutory construction to an international agreement may
potentially caution against the outcome of the case. Other actors, be they involved
parties in the case or other states which consider themselves to be injured by a
misapplication of international law, will have an easier task of arguing against
the outcome of a given case if its result has not been justified in terms of the
internationally accepted interpretative standards.
It is perfectly conceivable that individual courts may ignore foreign interpret-
ations of a norm of international law, or come up with interpretations that are
legally untenable. But these decisions are likely to fall into oblivion, at least for the
external audience; and it cannot be inferred from transgressions that the general
rule is invalid. The legal value of a precedent is almost universally determined by
its replicability; and we sustain that decisions based on the Vienna rules may have
a comparative advantage in this respect.
3. THE PRACTICE OF DOMESTIC COURTS: A COHERENT PICTURE?
With these general observations in mind, it is now time to turn to the practice of
domestic courts. A recent comparative study on the role of domestic courts in treaty
enforcement has come to the conclusion that among the examined legal systems
‘substantial similarities exist on the influence of the VCLT almost irrespective of
tradition andmember-state status’.42 A look at the country reports assembled in this
work casts a shadow of doubt over these generalizing conclusions. The country re-
portsonCanada, Israel, theNetherlands, Poland, andSouthAfrica showconsiderable
diversity with respect to the application of the Vienna rules.43
Giventhatfiveamongtheeleven jurisdictionsexaminedinthecomparativestudy
allow for further doubts over the impact of the international rules of interpretation
on the practice of domestic courts, it is an open question whether the conclusion
presented at the outset of this section can hold water.44 This is more so as the other
six country reports contained in the book do not precisely portray the respective
jurisdictions as faithful followers of the Vienna Convention approach.45
Thisstateofaffairsrequiresfurtherexaminationwhichmusteventuallybecarried
out in a broad and empirical manner. We aspire to highlight certain problematic
aspects of the recent practice of domestic courtswhichwill allowus to discussmore
thoroughly what is at stake when domestic courts decide whether or not to use the
international rules of interpretation, orwhen theydo so in a rather peculiarmanner.
In order to demonstrate the great variation between domestic courts’ inter-
pretative approaches to international law, we will present three case studies, i.e.
42 M. P. vanAlstine, ‘TheRole ofDomestic Courts in Treaty Enforcement: Summary andConclusion’, inD. Sloss
(ed.), The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty Enforcement (2009), 555 at 588–9.
43 See G. van Ert, ‘Canada’, in Sloss, supra note 42, 166 at 181–2; D. Kretzmer, ‘Israel’, in ibid., 273 at 298; A.
Nollkaemper, ‘The Netherlands’, in ibid., 326 at 362; L. Garlicki, M. Masternak-Kubiak, and K. Wo´jtowicz,
‘Poland’, in ibid., 370 at 389; J. Dugard, ‘South Africa’, in ibid., 448 at 464.
44 See alsoNollkaemper, supranote 7, at 219: ‘there is ample practicewhereby domestic courts apply principles
of domestic (statutory) interpretation, apparently unguided by international principles of interpretation’.
45 These are Australia, Germany, India, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom; see Sloss, supra note
42.
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the case law of the United States Supreme Court, the approaches to treaty inter-
pretation by the Supreme Court of Mexico, and the development of the case law of
the European Court of Justice on questions of international law. Instead of pursuing
a comprehensive survey of representative jurisdictions, the guiding principle of our
selection of jurisdictions aswell as of the particular caseswas to assess howcourts in
different cultural and political settings develop idiosyncratic approaches to treaty
interpretation.
3.1. Treaty interpretation in the US Supreme Court
For comparative as well as international lawyers, the case law of the US Supreme
Court is certainly among the most intriguing fields of study. Indeed, this fascin-
ation is owed in part to America’s political and cultural dominance, and to its
self-perception as a role model for various countries in transition from authoritar-
ianism to democracy. However, the deeper source of the court’s attractiveness seems
to lie in its heritage of two centuries, a time during which the court consistently
developed and refined its jurisprudence, without having much regard for the legal
upheavals simultaneously taking place in other nations.
3.1.1. Liberal interpretation and allegiance to the law of nations
Much has been written on the US Supreme Court’s methodology with respect to
treaty interpretation.46 However, most of the literature addresses the subject from a
USperspective,andthecourt’sbasicassumptionsarerarelyquestioned.Anoutstand-
ing feature of the American rules (‘canons’ in US parlance) of treaty interpretation
is that they reflect the development of the American attitude towards international
law and international relations over the past two centuries.47 As the US Constitu-
tion, while making properly ratified treaties part of the ‘supreme law of the land’,48
is silent on the means of their interpretation, courts were to follow their own legal
intuition (and certainly their idea of theUnited States’ place in theworld) to develop
a proper methodology. The canons thus designed at times resemble philosophical
principles rather than actual rules of decision.Most notably the canonof ‘good faith’
and its corollary, ‘liberal interpretation’, dominated US treaty interpretation from
the late nineteenth until the middle of the twentieth century, reflecting an inter-
nationalist attitude reminiscent of the writings of Grotius and Vattel.49 The goal of
46 See., e.g., D. Bederman, ‘Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation’, (1994) 41 UCLA Law Review 953;
C. Bradley, ‘Chevron Deference and International Relations’, (2000) 86 Virginia Law Review 649; L. Fisler
Damrosch, ‘Interpreting US Treaties in the Light of Human Rights Values’, (2002) 46 New York Law School
LawReview 43; Glashausser, supranote 39; D. H.Moore, ‘DoUSCourts Discriminate against Treaties?’, (2010)
110 Columbia Law Review 2228.
47 The general development of the American attitude towards international law has been thoroughly scrutin-
ized in several studies: see, e.g., D. Moynihan, On the Law of Nations (1990), focusing on the politico-legal
environment in which the process took place; for a survey of the US Supreme Court’s case law see D. Sloss,
M. Ramsey, andW. Dodge (eds.), International Law in the US Supreme Court (2011).
48 See the Supremacy Clause, Article VI, cl. 2 US Constitution: ‘and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land’.
49 H. Grotius, ‘On Interpretation’, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Book II, Ch. XVI; E. de Vattel, Le droit des gens, Tome I,
Chapter XVIII; a restatement of the traditional doctrines was provided by W. Hall, Treatise on International
Law, 4th edn. (1895), §§ 111–13.
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this expansive approach was to safeguard against inadvertent breaches of treaties
by judges whose understandings of treaty terms might be inconsistent with the
expectations of other parties.50 As Justice Stephen Field wrote in an 1890 decision:
As they [the treaties] are contracts between independent nations, in their construction
words are to be taken in their ordinary meaning, as understood in the public law of
nations, and not in any artificial sense impressed upon them by local law, unless such
restricted sense is clearly intended . . . . Where a treaty admits of two constructions, one
restrictive of rights thatmay be claimed under it and the other favourable to them, the
latter is to be preferred.51
Yet the precept of ‘good faith and liberal interpretation’ with respect to the con-
struction of treaty terms was but one part of a wider jurisprudential framework
the US Supreme Court had been developing ever since the Chief Justiceship of
John Marshall, in order to ensure the United States’ compliance with international
law. A famous example of this is the so-called ‘Charming Betsy rule’, an early in-
stance of a judicial application of the concept of ‘consistent interpretation’, which
refers to an interpretation of domestic law in conformitywith a state’s international
obligations.52 InMurray v. The Charming Betsy, Marshall boldly asserted that an act
of Congress ‘ought never be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
possible construction remains’.53 It is probably fair to attribute the court’s attitude
in The Charming Betsy as much to the idealistic visions of the framers about what
‘a decent respect to the opinions of mankind’ demanded, as to rather pragmatic
considerations of a young nation in a precarious strategic situation, trying to avoid
further frictions with foreign powers. Nevertheless, the generally positive attitude
of the US Supreme Court towards the domestic application of international law
persisted for more than a century.
3.1.2. Deference to executive discretion
Since themiddle of the twentieth century the internationalist approach silently fell
into desuetude.54 In particular during theChief Justiceship ofWilliamH. Rehnquist
(1986–2005), the Supreme Court was not so much interested in having recourse
to internationally accepted sources and methods of treaty interpretation. Instead,
the court preferred to look at the domestic executive branch for interpretative
guidance, as well as at the preratification debates in the Senate, just as if a treatywas
merely a domestic statute. A significant manifestation of this attitude occurred in
50 See The Amiable Isabella, 19 US 1, 68 (1821), where Justice Story stated that a treaty had to be interpreted in
‘the most scrupulous good faith’ in order to protect the government from the ‘disgrace’ caused by a possible
violation of its international obligations.
51 Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 US 258, 271 (1890). The latter part of this quotation could be read also as an early
formulation of the so-called pro persona principle, today somuch in vogue in several Latin American courts,
includingMexican tribunals. See infra section 3.2.3.
52 On consistent interpretation see Nollkaemper, supra note 7, Chapter VII.
53 Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 US 64, 118 (1804).
54 Cf. M. van Alstine, ‘The Death of Good Faith in Treaty Jurisprudence and a Call for Resurrection’, (2005) 93
Georgetown Law Journal 1885, at 1987: ‘Unfortunately, good faith has died.With no ceremony and outside the
scrutiny of scholars, it was silently interred by the Supreme Court early in the last century’.
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the 1992 decisionUS v.Alvarez-Machain,55 inwhich the court had to construe a 1978
extradition treaty withMexico.
In this case, the court held that the extraterritorial abduction of aMexican citizen
for the purpose of criminal prosecution in the US did not violate the extradition
treaty between the two countries, as no explicit prohibition of such abductions
could be found in the termsof the treaty.56 Themajority of the court didnot consider
the Mexican interpretation of the treaty, filed in an amicus curiae brief, according to
which a prohibition of extraterritorial abductions had to be regarded as a necessary
corollary of the extradition agreement. The court relied on the US government’s
interpretation as the controlling one, stating that any bilateral tension created
by the abduction should be resolved through diplomatic means without judicial
interference.57
Although the canon of interpretative deference to the political branches of gov-
ernment had already been applied occasionally in earlier decisions, since Alvarez-
Machain it has turned into a cornerstone of US treaty interpretation. However,
this canon is supplemented by two other distinct and at times contradictory inter-
pretational precepts: a narrow literalism, as apparent in Alvarez-Machain, and, on
the other hand, a tendency to resort to extratextual sources of interpretation in a
rather indiscriminate and unprincipled manner, even where no significant textual
ambiguity is discernible.
The most striking example of the latter approach was the case of Sale v. Haitian
Centers Council, Inc.58 In this case the court had to construe the extent of the non-
refoulement obligation under Article 33(1) UN Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees,59 providing that ‘[n]o contracting state shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers or territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, . . . ’. The question
was whether this prohibition applied to the practice of the US agencies to inter-
cept Haitian refugees on the high seas and return them to Haiti without having
determined their potential status as refugees. In the majority decision, Justice John
Paul Stevens managed to turn the all-encompassing language of the treaty, which
read ‘expel or return (‘refouler’) . . . in any manner whatsoever’, into an epitome of
vagueness, using domestic statutory provisions to prove that ‘expel or return’ could
only refer to the deportation of aliens already present in a state’s territory or at the
55 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 US 655 (1992).
56 This reading of the treaty was pungently criticized in a dissenting opinion authored by Justice Stevens, who
observed:
It is true, as the Court notes, that there is no express promise by either party to refrain from forcible
abductions intheterritoryof theothernation.Relyingonthatomission, theCourt, ineffect, concludes
that the Treaty merely creates an optional method of obtaining jurisdiction over alleged offenders,
and that the parties silently reserved the right to resort to self-help whenever they deem force more
expeditious than legal process.
To him, ‘themanifest scope and object of the treaty [implied] a mutual undertaking to respect the territorial
sovereignty of the other contracting party (504 US 655, at 674–5).
57 504 US 655, at 669 (at note 16).
58 Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 US 155 (1993).
59 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 UNTS 137.
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border, and relied on the French term refouler, inserted by the Convention’s drafters
to affirm the wide scope of the prohibition, to create further ambiguity:
This suggestion– that ‘return’ has a legalmeaningnarrower than its commonmeaning
– is reinforced by the parenthetical reference to ‘refouler’, a French word that is not an
exact synonym for the Englishword ‘return’. Indeed, neither of two respected English–
French dictionaries mentions ‘refouler’ as one of many possible French translations.60
Then, the court felt free to look beyond the text and affirm its result by a cursory
review of the travaux pre´paratoires, relyingmainly on an isolated statement by a rep-
resentative from theNetherlands. As often in theRehnquist Court’s treaty decisions,
this analysiswascarriedout ‘withoutanyreal appreciationof themechanicsof inter-
national conference diplomacy, and how those dynamics differ substantially from
legislative patterns’.61 Defying the clear language and purpose of the Convention,
the Court concluded that a state is entitled to send back refuge seekers, provided it
manages to interdict them before they arrive at its border. This was convincingly
criticized by Justice Harry Blackmun in his dissent:
Article 33.1 is clear not only in what it says, but also in what it does not say: It does not
include any geographical limitation. It limits onlywhere a refugeemay be sent ‘to’, not
where he may be sent from. This is not surprising, given that the aim of the provision
is to protect refugees against persecution.62
This decision demonstrates that the canon of good faith and liberal interpretation
had lost all of its attraction. The admonition of Justice Field that ‘words are to be
taken in their ordinarymeaning, as understood in the public law of nations, and not
in any artificial sense impressed upon them by local law’, was deliberately ignored.
3.1.3. A comeback of liberal interpretation?
As of today, there are indications that the Supreme Court’s attitude towards treaty
interpretation is changing again. In the 2010 case of Abbott v. Abbott,63 the court’s
majority used language reminiscent of the canons of good faith and liberal inter-
pretation. In this case, the court was called upon to interpret the scope of the Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International ChildAbduction, an international
treaty dealing with the issue of cross-border custody disputes; in particular, the
Convention provides for the immediate return of a child that has been wrongfully
removed by a parent from its country of habitual residence.
In Abbott, the petitioner was a British national who had lived with his American
wife and theirminor son inChile.After theparents divorced, the competentChilean
family court granted the mother the sole right of custody, while the father was
awarded visitation rights. These visitation rights implied under Chilean law that
the court imposedane exeatorder,meaning that themother couldnotbring thechild
outside the country without the father’s, or alternatively the court’s, permission. In
violationof thisne exeat, themother travelledwithher sontoTexas,where shesettled
60 Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 US 155, 180 (1993).
61 Bederman, supra note 46, at 275.
62 Haitian Centers (Blackmun J. dissenting), at 193.
63 Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S.Ct. 1983 (2010).
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with the child. Mr Abbott sued his former wife in US courts, seeking return of his
son to Chile under the Hague Convention. When the case reached the US Supreme
Court, the sole question was whetherMs Abbott had wrongfully removed the child
within the meaning of Article 12 of the Convention, as this would require the US
authorities to order the son’s immediate return. Article 3 of the Hague Convention
defines awrongful removal as a removal ‘in breach of rights of custody attributed to
a person’, whereas Article 5 specifies rights of custody as ‘rights relating to the care
of the person of the child and, in particular, the right to determine the child’s place
of residence’. Now the court had to decide whether the ne exeat order bestowed on
Mr Abbott a right of custody. InAbbott v.Abbott, the Supreme Court was not divided
along the usual ideological faultlines but rather right across them. This case saw
Justices Stevens, Thomas, andBreyer united in dissent,while Justices Roberts, Scalia,
Ginsburg, Alito, and Sotomayor joined the majority opinion authored by Justice
Kennedy.
In the decision, Justice Kennedy started by conducting a (con)textual analysis
of the relevant provisions, particularly the definition of custody in Article 5, and
concluded that Mr Abbott’s ne exeat right was a right to ‘determine the child’s place
of residence’ as well as a ‘right related to the care’ of his son, stressing that the
Convention’s ‘broad’ definition of custodyhad to override narrower understandings
in order to bring as many cases as possible within the purview of the Convention’s
return remedy.64
Hedidnot,however, bother todiscuss the fact that theConventiondrawsacareful
distinctionbetween rights of custody and rights of access, providing adistinct, lesser
remedy for violations of the latter; an omission that Justice Stevens took issue with
in his dissent. Kennedy went on to affirm the conclusion of his textual analysis by
invoking evidence from different sources: first, he relied on the view of the State
Department, citingthe ‘wellestablishedcanonofdeferencetotheexecutive’ in treaty
interpretation.65 His argument in favour of the deference canon, that the executive
branch possesses a greater insight ‘in delicate matters of international relations’, is
questionable in an area like international family law, which is at least as much the
domain of the judiciary as of the executive.66
Kennedy then turned to thepracticeof theotherparties to theHagueConvention,
stressing the need for a ‘uniform international interpretation’ thatwas also acknow-
ledged by Congress in the statute implementing the treaty.67 In analysing the case
law of other state parties, Kennedy found ‘broad acceptance’ for his conclusion that
a ne exeat right amounted to a right of custody under Article 3 of the Convention;
he cited decisions from the United Kingdom, Germany, South Africa, Austria, and
64 130 S.Ct. 1983, at 1993.
65 Ibid.
66 See for experiences of different state partieswith the implementationof theHagueConvention, e.g., N. Lowe,
‘The1980HagueConventionon theCivilAspectsof InternationalChildAbductions:AnEnglishPerspective’,
(2000) 33NYU Journal of International Law and Politics 179; K. Siehr, ‘The 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of InternationalChildAbductions: Failures andSuccesses inGermanPractice’, (2000) 33NYUJournal
of International Law and Politics 207; M. Bailey, ‘Canada’s Implementation of the 1980 Hague Convention on
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction’, (2000) 33NYU Journal of International Law and Politics 17.
67 130 S.Ct. 1983, at 1994.
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Israel. Admitting that Canadian courts held a different view, and that French courts
were divided, he distinguished these unfavourable decisions, concluding that they
did not address exactly the situation at hand. Then he raised an interesting question
of intertemporality, noting that joint custodial arrangements had previously been
unknown inmany contracting states,whereas he alleged the existence of a ‘growing
international consensus’ acknowledging ne exeat rights as rights of custody.
In the last part of his majority opinion, Kennedy resorted to teleology, asserting
boldly that theConvention’s object andpurpose, ‘todeter child abductions’, required
judges ‘to avoid a common tendency to prefer their own society and culture, a
tendency that ought not interfere with objective consideration of all the factors’.68
He concluded with praise for the role of domestic judges in the administration of
international law:
This judicial neutrality is presumed from the mandate of the Convention, which
affirms that the contracting states are ‘[f]irmly convinced that the interests of children
are of paramount importance in matters relating to their custody.’ . . . International
law serves a high purpose when it underwrites the determination by nations to rely
upon their domestic courts to enforce just laws by legitimate and fair proceedings.69
Thedissenters inAbbott forgedanunlikelyalliancebetweenamoderateconservative
(or conservative liberal, Stevens), an originalist (Thomas), and a liberal pragmatist
(Breyer). Justice Stevens, writing for the dissenters, sharply dismissed themajority’s
textual analysis. He argued that Mr Abbott’s ne exeat right could not possibly be
describedas a rightof custodyunderArticle 3 andArticle 5of theHagueConvention,
as it had been granted solely to protect his visitation right, which Stevens equated
to a right of access under Article 5; as such, it did not trigger the return remedy. In
stressing this differentiation, he extensively relied on the travaux pre´paratoiresof the
Convention. Concluding that the text was unambiguously clear, Stevens pungently
attacked the majority’s reliance on the State Department’s view and the foreign
judgments.He rejected the canonof executive deference as inapplicable andwarned
against ‘substitut[ing] the judgment of other courts for our own’.70
Interestingly, he did not only question the existence of a current international
consensus as to the issue of ne exeat rights being rights of custody; even under
the assumption that such consensus had emerged, he was not willing to take that
development into account:
Even assuming that the Court is correct that consensus has emerged after the Conven-
tion was written and ratified that ne exeat rights should be ‘rights of custody,’ in my
view this provides no support at all for the position that the Convention’s drafters had
these types of rights in mind and intended for the Convention to treat them as rights
of custody.71
68 Ibid., at 1996.
69 Ibid., at 1996.
70 Ibid., at 2009.
71 Ibid., at 2009 (at note 13).
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This is certainly an interesting move for a justice who had not been known as an
originalist beforehand.72 Apparently, treaty caseshave thepotential toblur theusual
ideological front lines. Despite the fact that Justice Stevens had referred toArticle 32
VCLT to criticize the majority’s reference to extratextual sources notwithstanding
the lack of ambiguity, he did not generally follow the Vienna rules, nor did he seem
to be aware of the concept of ‘subsequent practice’, as provided for inArticle 31(3)(b)
of the Vienna Convention.
Looking at the Abbott case as a whole, it can be said that both majority opinion
and dissent are deeply rooted in the tradition of American treaty interpretation,
with all its advantages and pitfalls. Themajority seems engaged in a careful attempt
to resuscitate the canon of good faith and liberal interpretation, given its repeated
emphasis on the importance of a wide international understanding of the treaty
terms. From a pragmatist point of view, this new–old approach has the potential
to reduce international irritations created by parochial readings of international
agreements. As this case dealt solely with private rights, however, it has to be seen
whether the Court will continue to apply this canon when individual rights are
invoked against the state.73
Also, the use of foreign decisions by the majority, as well as the weight assigned
to them, reduces the likelihood of judicial unilateralism such as the one seen during
the Rehnquist era. Yet the dissent is correct in pointing to the inconsistencies of the
majority’s approach; and the question of the threshold of ambiguity required to per-
mit recourse to extratextual sources of interpretation has not yet been conclusively
answered by the Supreme Court. The canon of executive deference is certainly a
two-edged sword: it may well be desirable that the Supreme Court be informed by
the State Department’s assessment of the possible consequences a certain decision
may have for US relations with its treaty partners; it is, however, a dangerous move
when the Court starts to colludewith the executive to reduce the scope of the rights
of individuals under international instruments.
Probably the most challenging question posed by Abbott and like cases is not
limited to theUS SupremeCourt, but is in fact a general problem of treaty interpret-
ation, particularly present in the case of subsequent practice: how many states are
required for a ‘growing international consensus’ to which a court ought to defer?
This question, amatter of disputebetweenmajority anddissent inAbbott, shows that
themethodology of ‘comparative international law’74 is still in its infancy. As Justice
Blackmun once observed, ‘modern jurists are notably lacking in the diplomatic ex-
perience of early Justices like John Jay and John Marshall, who were familiar with
the lawof nations and comfortable navigating by it’.75 But since it is required by stra-
tegic considerations as well as a ‘decent respect to the Opinions of Mankind’76 that
72 Although themotives for adopting an originalist positionunder international lawmay arguably be different
from those of constitutional originalists.
73 P. B. Stephan raises the same question in his brief comment on the case: ‘Abbott v. Abbott: A New Take on
Treaty Interpretation by the Supreme Court’, (2010) 14ASIL Insight Issue 24.
74 Onthis concept seeM.Koskenniemi, ‘TheCase forComparative InternationalLaw’, (2009)20FinnishYearbook
of International Law 1; Roberts, supra note 7.
75 H. Blackmun, ‘The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations’, (1994) 104 Yale Law Journal 39, at 49.
76 See the Declaration of Independence (1776):
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national courts applying international law shall explain their actions and justify
them, it can bewonderedwhether the US SupremeCourt will eventually embrace a
more internationalist approach to treaty interpretation.Thedecision inAbbottoffers
some hope that the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Roberts could be willing to
reconsider its interpretative precepts in order to adjust to an internationally more
accepted ‘language’ of treaty interpretation.
3.2. Treaty interpretation byMexican courts
Until themid-1990s, the relationshipofMexicancourtswith international lawwasa
distant one,mostly dealingwith extradition treaties and constrained to narrow ana-
lyses of the treaties’ internal validity vis-a`-vis constitutional norms. Federal judges
(jueces de distrito) in amparo proceedings77 usually applied extremely formalistic
criteria for determining the validity of said treaties, whereas the highest court, the
SupremeCourtof Justiceof theNation(SCJNorSupremeCourt),usedtoanalyse (and
affirm) the treaties’ constitutionality on the basis of more systemic and teleological
interpretations of theMexicanConstitution.78 In the fewcases a treaty found itsway
to the federal tribunals or to the Supreme Court, these judicial bodies were much
more concerned with the status of treaties within the hierarchy of sources of the
national legal order79 thanwith the interpretation of their content. If interpretation
of treaty norms occurred, it used to be strictly literal, or (con)textual at most.
3.2.1. Mexico’s transition to democracy and the new attitude of the judiciary towards
international law
As many other things in Mexico, the judicial approach described above began to
change by the mid-1990s, due in part to the newly experienced economic integra-
tion of North America, but mostly to the democratic shift of the country. A major
judicial reform in 1995 considerably extended the competences of the Supreme
Court with respect to questions of constitutional control.80 In relation to treaties,
When in the Course of human Events, it becomes necessary for one People to dissolve the Political
Bands which have connected themwith another, and to assume among the Powers of the Earth, the
separate and equal Station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them, a decent
Respect to the Opinions of Mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them
to the Separation.
77 On this protective judicial remedy of constitutional rights, originally from Mexico and common to several
Latin American states, see A. R. Brewer-Carı´as, Constitutional Protection of Human Rights in Latin America: A
Comparative Study of Amparo Proceedings (2008).
78 SeeJ.C.TronPetit, ‘LaAplicacio´ndelosTratadosInternacionalesporlosTribunalesMexicanos’, inUniversidad
Nacional Auto´noma deMe´xico (UNAM)/TheAmerican Society of International Law (ASIL) (eds.),El Papel del
Derecho Internacional en Ame´rica, La Soberanı´a Nacional en la Era de la Integracio´n Regional (1997), 143 at 152–4.
79 Art. 133 of theMexican Constitution establishes the ‘supreme law of the land’ formula:
This Constitution, the laws of Congress which are made in pursuance thereof, and all the treaties
which are made and will be made by the President of the Republic, with the approval of the Senate,
and which are in accordance with it [the Constitution], shall be Supreme Law of the entire Union.
See Constitucio´n Polı´tica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, available at www.diputados.gob.mx/
LeyesBiblio/pdf/1.pdf (last visited 2March 2013). Translation by the authors.
80 The reformwaspublishedon31December 1994, the samemonthPresidentZedillo tookoffice, and came into
force on 1 January 1995. See Diario Oficial de la Federacio´n (DOF), 31 December 1994, 2. For an overview, see
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the most important aspect of the reform was the creation of the ‘action of uncon-
stitutionality’ (accio´n de inconstitucionalidad), i.e. an abstract and a posteriori review
of the constitutionality of federal and state laws as well as of treaties. However, it
would be too simplistic to say that it was only a matter of time for the Supreme
Court and federal tribunals to gain themuch-needed self-confidence to put the new
rules into effect. The overall democratization of the country was crucial in order for
the courts to operate as a truly independent power.81
The cases we will be dealing with here, which show a more autonomous, some-
times even self-opinionated attitude of Mexican judges towards international law,
were all decided after the transition to democracy culminated in the presidential
election of 2000.82 This new attitude has experienced and is still undergoing its
own evolution, which in some instances may reflect broader juridical as well as
socio-political and cultural developments of the country and beyond, and in others
is probably just part of internal processes of the courts. It is plausible to distinguish
between two phases of this ongoing evolution: an initial period of assimilation
which was then followed by a phase of self-assertion.
3.2.2. The need for assimilation
After a long timeof relative abstention fromquestions of international law,Mexico’s
SupremeCourtneededfirst toengage inan ‘assimilationperiod’. In thisphase,which
coincided roughlywith the first five years after the presidential election of 2000, the
SupremeCourt developed its new approach to international law by establishing the
broadlines for treaty interpretationinthedomestic legalsystem.Arespectful though
distant attitudewas still perceivable in a ruling of 2002,83 which resulted froma case
of alleged inconsistencies of certain provisions of the Federal Customs Law with
Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994).84 Here, the
Supreme Court determined that in order to ‘unravel the scope’ of a treaty provision,
the rules of interpretation of the Vienna Convention ‘must’ be followed, further
emphasizing that these rules ‘bind the Supreme Court’.85 Certainly, this approach
was informedby the traditional self-understandingofmostLatinAmericancourts as
organsof the statewhichhave thedutynot tobreach the international obligationsof
their respective states. Accordingly, this reasoning need not be exclusively owed to a
newfound acceptance of international law, but can also be seen as a reminiscence of
the old self-perception of the SCJN as subordinated to the federal executive towhich
deference was owed in questions of international law.
H. Fix-Fierro, ‘Judicial Reform in Mexico: What Next?’, in E. G. Jensen and T. C. Heller (eds.), Beyond Common
Knowledge: Empirical Approaches to the Rule of Law (2003), 240.
81 See P. Navia and J. Rı´os-Figueroa, ‘The Constitutional Adjudication Mosaic of Latin America’, (2005) 38
Comparative Political Studies 188, at 196.
82 There is much debate about the different phases of this transition and when exactly it ended, if at all; see
further J. Woldenberg,Historia Mı´nima de la Transicio´n Democra´tica en Me´xico (2012).
83 SCJN, 9a E´poca, 2a Sala, Semanario Judicial de la Federacio´n y su Gaceta (SJFyG), XVI, 292, Tesis CLXXI/2002
(December 2002).
84 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1867 UNTS 187.
85 See SCJN Tesis CLXXI/2002, supra note 83.
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But the Court also interpreted theVienna rules of interpretation in itsGATT case.
Although the SCJN first limited itself to explaining them by restating their content,
it made three noteworthy clarifications: first, it ruled that recourse to Articles 31
and 32 VCLT was subject to Article 14, paragraph 4 of the Mexican Constitution,
which establishes the principle of legality in non-military trials and gives strict
priority to the method of literal interpretation.86 It thereby somehow ascribed a
primacy to textual interpretation, which seems to go beyond what Article 31(1)
VCLT says. Second, it ‘translated’87 the said provision into its own hermeneutics
terminology of ‘literal’, ‘systemic’, and ‘teleological’ interpretations.88 And finally,
the SCJN underlined the separation of Articles 31 and 32 VCLT by stating that
‘in principle, one shall not turn to the preparatory works of a treaty nor to the
circumstances surrounding its conclusion’.89
Even if it is hard to imagine how, in a concrete case, the application of Articles
31 and 32 VCLT could run counter to Article 14 of the Constitution, in that initial
period of a new international openness, it was necessary for the Court to reaffirm
its primary role as the guardian of Mexico’smagna carta. Although the Court’s rigid
reading of the relationship between Articles 31 and 32 is compatible with the VCLT,
taken together with its emphasis on literal meaning and the safeguard made in
relation to the Mexican Constitution, it denotes its hermeneutical preference at
that time, and, arguably, a lack of experience with treaty interpretation. One cannot
help but to be reminded of the concerns expressed by Myres S. McDougal at the
Vienna Conference, namely that said separation could lay a predominant emphasis
on a purely literal approach, leading thus the interpreter to futilely focus on the
‘ordinary meaning’ of the text.90
In the following years, these standards began to be applied by federal tribunals
and the SupremeCourt itself, and as is common in learning processes, the use of the
Vienna rules and the Court’s interpretation of them have been rather inconsistent.
An interesting example is the Cavallo case of 2003, where the extradition of an
Argentinian citizen – and former army officer – to Spain on the basis of universal
jurisdiction for the crimes of genocide and terrorism allegedly committed during
the military regime in Argentina was confirmed by the Supreme Court.91 Here,
reference was made to the ruling on treaty interpretation of 2002. However, one
of the few proper interpretations performed by the SCJN of the treaties at hand,
namely that regarding Article II of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
86 See Constitucio´n Polı´tica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, supra note 79.
87 Borrowing the expression from Knop, supra note 7.
88 See SCJN Tesis CLXXI/2002, supra note 83: ‘This [Article 31(1) VCLT] means that recourse to the methods of
literal, systemic and teleological interpretation shall be made’.
89 Ibid.
90 See UN Conference on the Law of Treaties, Summary Records of the Plenary Meetings and of the Meetings of the
Committee on the Whole (Official Records), First Session, Vienna, 26 March–28 May 1968, (1969), 167–8, paras.
38–50; see also Gardiner, supra note 27, at 303–6.
91 SCJN,Amparo en revisio´n 140/2002 (10 June2003). SeeM.BecerraRamı´rez, ‘ElCasoCavallo’, (2004) 4Anuario
Mexicano de Derecho Internacional (AMDI), 585; V. Thalmann, ‘National Criminal Jurisdiction over Genocide’,
in P. Gaeta (ed.), The UN Genocide Convention: A Commentary (2009), 231, at 256. Ricardo Miguel Cavallo was
sentenced to life prison by a federal tribunal in Argentina; see Tribunal Federal No. 5, sentencia 26 de Octubre
de 2011.
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Punishment of theCrimeofGenocide92 and the allegedpolitical nature of the crime,
was reached through the analysis of the drafting history of the said Convention in
the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly, without first resorting to the
general rule on interpretation of the Vienna Convention, or otherwise justifying
immediate recourse to its Article 32. In particular, the Supreme Court recalled a
proposal to add to the elements of the crime of genocide racial, religious, or political
motivations, which was rejected by the delegation of the United Kingdom on the
basis that the intention to destroy, totally or partially, a national, ethnic, or religious
groupwas the constitutive element of the crime, regardless of themotivation of the
perpetrator.93 The SupremeCourt deviated thus from the excessive literal approach
it had proclaimed just the year before.
In a case from 200494 related to intellectual property rights contained in the 1883
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property,95 in the 1994 Agreement
on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),96 and in NAFTA,97
the highest Court once again acknowledged the Vienna rules on interpretation.
However, incontrast to the2002GATTcase, this time theCourtdidnot talkanymore
of an obligation to apply the Vienna rules, but said that these ‘shall be pondered’.98
Furthermore, the Court embraced amoderate dualist approach to international law
in order to emphasize that treaties do not have a direct effect in Mexican law. After
doing this, it arrived rather oddly at the conclusion that, given the fact that treaties
undergo a process of approval by the Senate and publication in the official federal
gazette, they enjoy a presumption of constitutionality. It is interesting to see how
the Court found it necessary to refer to international doctrine in order to deny
direct effect to treaties,99 and at the same time connected this denial to a relatively
treaty-friendly interpretative guideline.
One of the cases that has caught the broadest public attention in Mexico in the
recent history of the Supreme Court is the Halcones case,100 related to the killings
of students during the Dirty War of the 1970s at the hands of paramilitary-like
commandos. The judgment of June 2005 has beenmuch criticized by human rights
groups and academia,101 inter alia, because it declared that, according to the Consti-
tution and the interpretative declaration made by Mexico when ratifying the 1968
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and
Crimes against Humanity,102 the said Convention could not apply retroactively to
92 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 UNTS 277.
93 See supra note 91.
94 SCJN, Amparo en revisio´n 237/2002 (2 April 2004).
95 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 828 UNTS 305.
96 1994 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 1869 UNTS 299.
97 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement, (1993) 32 ILM 289, 605.
98 See supra note 94.
99 For a different approach to this issue, see infra section 3.3.3.
100 SCJN, Recurso de Apelacio´n 1/2004-PS Derivado de la Facultad de Atraccio´n 8/2004-PS (15 June 2005).
101 See, e.g., M. Becerra Ramı´rez, ‘Comments on the Mexican Supreme Court of Justice Ruling on the Halcones
Case’, (2007) 8 (Old Series) Mexican Law Review; J. Donde´ Matute, ‘The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights
Violations before the Supreme Court of Mexico’, (2009) 124 Boletı´n Mexicano de Derecho Comparado, 191.
102 1968 Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against
Humanity, 754 UNTS 73. The interpretative declaration can also be found at 754 UNTS 73.
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its entry into force forMexico, i.e. before 22April 2002.103 In an individual vote (voto
particular), which in fact constitutes a dissenting opinion, Justice SilvaMeza, today’s
president of theCourt, declared that theprinciple of non-retroactivity contemplated
in the Constitution was not applicable to the Convention, to whichMexico had ac-
ceded by virtue of its sovereign consent. Mexico had thus an obligation towards
the international community to interpret this treaty in conformity with its object
and purpose. He referred to the Vienna rules and the 2002 GATT case in order to
determine that the interpretative declaration of Mexico was contrary to the object
and purpose of the Convention, and, therefore, should have been declared void by
the Court.104 The contrast to the attitude of complete deference to the executive
reigning in Mexico until the mid-1990s and still visible in the early years of dem-
ocracy is clear: loyalty was now owed to the international community. The indi-
vidual vote of Justice Silva Meza can be regarded as signalling the transition to the
next step identified here, which arguably reflects a much broader development of
judicial self-assertion inMexico and in other Latin American countries.105
3.2.3. The need for self-assertion
Today Mexican tribunals are delineating their way of dealing with treaties. A ten-
dencycanbeobservedaccording towhich thepropersonaprinciple is beingextended
continuously. This is, in part, the consequence of the constitutional reform of June
2011,106 whereby human rights contained in treaties to whichMexico is a party are
placed at the highest level alongwith theConstitution, and the pro personaprinciple
is recognized, together with that of consistent interpretation, as the hermeneut-
ical framework for Mexican judges when confronted with human rights (Article
1 of the Mexican Constitution).107 However, this trend was already present at the
Mexican judiciary before June 2011. Directly influenced by the jurisprudence of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) and some national courts in Latin
America, federal tribunals began to apply this interpretational approach as early as
2004.108
Be that as it may, after the reform of June 2011 and a paradigmatic resolution of
the SupremeCourt issued only amonth later on the occasion of questions related to
103 The Convention was signed on 3 June 1969, ratified on 15 March 2002, and published in the official federal
gazette on 22 April 2002; see DOF, 22 April 2002, 10.
104 The individual vote restated Justice Silva Meza’s original draft of the ruling, which was rejected by the
majority of the Court’s Second Chamber on 9 March 2005. See Ponencia del Ministro Juan Silva Meza,
Proyecto de Recurso de Apelacio´n 1/2004-PS derivado de la Facultad de Atraccio´n 8/2004-PS (23 February
2005).
105 Also relating Silva Meza’s vote with the then emerging preference of the pro persona principle, see J. Donde´
Matute, ‘El Derecho Internacional y su Relevancia en el Sistema Jurı´dico Mexicano: Una Perspectiva Juris-
prudencial’, (2009) 9 AMDI, 191, at note 41.
106 SeeDOF, 10 June 2011, 2. For a first comprehensive study on the reform, seeM. Carbonell and P. Salazar (eds.),
La Reforma Constitucional de Derechos Humanos: Un Nuevo Paradigma (2011), 449.
107 See supra note 79.
108 Donde´ Matute refers to a case of 2004 of the Fourth Collegiate Tribunal on Administrative Matters for the
First Circuit dealing with the dismissal of a member of the armed forces who had been tested HIV-positive,
supra note 105, at 205–8.
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the implementation of the Radilla judgment of the IACHR,109 the pro homine or pro
persona principle – as the SCJN prefers – is today the undisputed maxim regarding
the interpretation of human rights treaties. In its opinion on this case, the Supreme
Court stated that every public authority in Mexico, including the entire judicial
system, shall always opt for the most favourable interpretation of the human right
under consideration, be it a human right established in the Constitution or in a
treaty to which Mexico is a party.110 Following this opinion, in a ruling of January
2012, the Court went significantly further bymentioning that
the norms related to human rights shall be interpreted in conformity with the Consti-
tution itself and with international treaties to which Mexico is a party, in a way that
broadly favours persons. This translates into the obligation to analyze content and
scope of such rights on the basis of the propersonaprinciple, a hermeneutical criterion
which informs the whole international law of human rights, and according to which
the widest norm or the most extensive interpretation has to be applied . . . 111
The pro persona principle is as intuitive as it is tautological. It could be argued that
it is the object and purpose of every human rights treaty to grant the broadest
possible protection to each of the rights it contains,112 and that everything else
would run counter to their very normative function. The limits of this principle
become apparent when human rights of different individuals have to be balanced.
In any case, since the determination of the human rights nature of specific treaty
norms is again a matter of treaty interpretation, the application of the pro persona
principle can lead to a very wide extension of its own scope. There is the risk of
looking at every treaty provision entailing rights or otherwise affecting the legal
situation of individuals through the lenses of human rights.
In what has become another frequent tool of treaty interpretation related to
the pro persona principle, Mexican tribunals – like many of their peers in Latin
America113 – rely more and more on the interpretations of the IACHR, also for
questions which concern treaties which are not part of the Inter-American system.
For instance, the finding of the San Jose´ Court that Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations114 belonged to the category of human rights115
109 SCJN, Pleno, Varios 912/2010 (14 July 2011), reprinted in DOF (4 October 2011), Segunda Seccio´n, 51. This
resolution isnotbinding, but rather a sort of opinionof theCourt as awhole,whichexerts a strongpersuasive
power onMexican judges.
110 Ibid., para. 27.
111 SCJN, 10a E´poca, Primera Sala, tesis aislada XXVI/2012, V SJFyG (February 2012), 659. Translation by the
authors; emphasis added.
112 In a concurrent opinion, former Mexican Judge of the IACHR, Sergio Garcı´a Ramı´rez, relates the pro homine
principle contemplated in Article 29 of the ACHR to the object and purpose of the Convention by making
express reference toArticle 31 (1) of theVCLT. See IACHR,Case of theMayagna (Sumo)AwasTingniCommunity
v.Nicaragua,Merits, Reparations andCosts, Judgment (31August 2001), Series C,No. 79, ConcurringOpinion
of Judge Sergio Garcı´a Ramı´rez, at para. 2. On pro persona beyond the Inter-American system, see L. Crema,
‘Disappearance and New Sightings of Restrictive Interpretation(s)’, (2010) 21 EJIL 681, at 688–91.
113 See, e.g., C. Binder, ¿Hacia una Corte Constitucional de Ame´rica Latina? La Jurisprudencia de la Corte
Interamericana de Derechos Humanos con un Enfoque Especial Sobre las Amnistı´as’, in A. von Bogdandy, E.
Ferrer Mac-Gregor, andM. Morales Antoniazzi (eds.), La Justicia Constitucional y su Internacionalizacio´n ¿Hacia
un Ius Constitutionale Commune en Ame´rica Latina? (2010), Vol. II, 159.
114 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 596 UNTS 261.
115 See IACHR, The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Due Process of Law, Advisory
Opinion, OC-16/99 (1 October 1999), Series A, No. 16, in particular operative clause 2.
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was followed by a Mexican federal tribunal, while noting the widespread use of
the San Jose´ jurisprudence by other courts in the region.116 This decision of 2007
was echoed recently by the Supreme Court in the politically controversial case of
Florence Cassez which involved a French citizen sentenced to 60 years in prison for
kidnapping.117 On23 January 2013,118 theCourt’s First Chamber voted in favour of a
draft previouslypreparedby JusticeZaldı´var119 andordered the immediate releaseof
Florence Cassez. The draft reproduced the IACHR interpretation of Article 36 of the
Vienna Convention as being ‘part of the corpus iuris of contemporary international
human rights law’, and erroneously sought further support for this position in the
2004Avena decision of the ICJ.120
The tautological nature of thepro personaprinciplenot only leads to anexpansion
of its scope of application, it also tends to inflate its ownmeaning. Other competing
considerations are not truly considered and every other method of interpretation is
finally subordinated to the pro personamaxim. A case in point is a recent judgment
ofMexico’s Supreme Court in relation to the right to have a name.121 Here, a person
wanted to change his double surname, asking for the deletion of its second part.
Administrative authorities and judges of the state of Aguascalientes consistently
refused tomake the change, since the state’s Civil LawCode establishes strict restric-
tions to this procedure which the original petition clearly did not meet. When the
case reached the SCJN, the plaintiff claimed that its human right to change her/his
name on the basis of Article 18 of the American Convention on Human Rights
(ACHR) was violated. This Article states:
Every person has the right to a given name and to surnames of his parents or that of
one of them. The law shall regulate themanner inwhich this right shall be ensured for
all, by the use of assumed names if necessary.122
Theplaintiff argued inparticular that the lower courts had failed to interpretArticle
18 in the light of the pro persona principle, as was allegedly required under Article
1 of the Mexican Constitution. In its ruling from January 2012, the First Chamber
of the SCJN engaged in an analysis of the meaning and scope of the human right
to have a name established in Article 29 of the Constitution (which does not say
much) and ‘in light of the international commitments acquired by the Mexican
116 Primer Tribunal Colegiado del Segundo Circuito en Materia Penal, Amparo directo 98/2007. See Donde´
Matute, supra note 105, at 211–15.
117 See ‘Hollande: “Une pe´riode particulie`rement douloureuse prend fin”’, Le Monde.fr, 23 January
2013, available at www.lemonde.fr/ameriques/article/2013/01/23/hollande-une-periode-particulierement-
douloureuse-prend-fin_1821516_3222.html (last visited 4 March 2013); see also M. Delgado, ‘Reciben a
Cassez con OtroMontaje’, Reforma, 24 January 2013.
118 At the time of writing, the ruling has not been published; see, however, the records of the pub-
lic hearings at SCJN, Primera Sala, Sesio´n Pu´blica, Acta Nu´mero 3, 23 January 2013, available at
www.scjn.gob.mx/Primera_Sala/1ra_listas_actassesion/ActaSesPub20130123.pdf (last visited 4March 2013).
119 See Ponencia del Ministro Arturo Zaldı´var Lelo de Larrea, Proyecto de Resolcuio´n en el Amparo directo en
revisio´n 517/2011.
120 On that occasion, the ICJ stated: ‘Whether or not the Vienna Convention rights are human rights is not a
matter that this Court need decide’.Case ConcerningAvena andOtherMexicanNationals (Mexico v. United States
of America), Judgment of 31March 2004, [2004] ICJ Rep. 12, paras. 124–125.
121 SCJN, Amparo en revisio´n 2424/2011 (18 January 2012).
122 1969 American Convention on Human Rights, 1144 UNTS 123.
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State on the matter’.123 Then, the Court clarified that in conformity with the newly
amended Article 1 of Mexico’s fundamental law, the constitutionally guaranteed
right to a name must indeed be interpreted in accordance with the pro persona
and the systemic interpretative methods. The latter was then defined following the
IACHR jurisprudence, which has consistently stated that the ‘interpretation of a
treaty should take into account not only the agreements and documents directly
related to it (paragraph two of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention), but also the
system of which it is a part (paragraph three of Article 31 of this Convention)’.124
The Mexican Court, however, limited the ‘normative environment’ which shall
be taken into account in the interpretation of human rights treaty norms to those
normsof the ‘samenature’,making thusaquestionable interpretationof theSan Jose´
Court’s obiter dicta on systemic integration, and thereby of Article 31(3)(c) itself. But
beyond that, it is not clear how the several treaty norms towhich theCourt referred,
such as Article 24(2) of the ICCPR,125 Article 8 of the 1989 Convention on the Rights
of the Child,126 and Article 16(g) of the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women,127 are relevant for the claim that Article
18 of the ACHR entails a right to change the name. The Court then brought in the
interpretation of the IACHR. In two cases, Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic128
and ‘Las Dos Erres Massacre’ v. Guatemala, the latter has established that the right
contained in Article 18 entails the guarantee by the state
that a person is registered with the name chosen by that person or his/her parents, de-
pending on the time of the registration, without any sort of restriction on the right nor
interferencewiththedecisiontochooseaname.Oncethepersonis registered, theirpos-
sibility to preserve and re-establish their name and surname should be guaranteed.129
The SCJN then resorted, in a rather automatic modus, to the pro persona principle,
transforming the ‘authorized interpretation’ of the San Jose´ Court into the following
formula: ‘once the person is registered, the possibility to preserve or modify their
name and surname shall be guaranteed’.130 This new interpretation (modification?)
of the right to have a name applies directly only to Article 29 of the Mexican
Constitution, but it is based, according the Court, on the pro persona interpretation
and the systemic integration of Article 18 of the American Convention; one might
add on the pro persona interpretation of Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT. The result not
only is highly questionable from the systemic perspective of international law, as
well as from that ofMexico’s federal system, it alsomight be hard to sustain by even
themost fervent defenders of the pro homine principle in San Jose´.
123 Supra note 121, para. 28.
124 Ibid., para. 46, referring to theMapiripa´nMassacre v. Colombia and Yakye Axa v. Paraguay cases (both 2005), as
well as to the advisory opinion OC-16 of 1999.
125 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171.
126 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1577 UNTS 3.
127 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination againstWomen, 1249 UNTS 13.
128 See IACHR, Case of the Girls Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Judgment (8 September 2005), Series C, No.
130, paras. 181 et seq.
129 IACHR, Case of Las ‘Dos Erres’ Massacre v. Guatemala, Judgment (24 November 2009), Series C, No. 211, para.
192.
130 Supra note 121, para. 57. Translation by the authors, emphasis added.
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We have thus seen that in the past twelve years, the Mexican Supreme Court
and some federal tribunals havemoved from a rather passive and discrete to amore
active, and in more recent cases even self-opinionated, attitude towards the inter-
pretation of treaties. Narrow formalistic concerns regarding constitutional treaty-
making powers and the place of treaties within the domestic legal order were set
aside, allowing for a dynamic understanding of the treaties’ normative contents.
Although the Supreme Court initiated this new phase of engagement by restating
the Vienna rules of interpretation as the basic parameters of the game, it signalled
almost fromthebeginning that the game tobeplayedby itwould also follow its own
peculiarities. Accordingly, it soon diluted the strictness of these rules by clarifying
that they should ‘be pondered’. A dissenting opinion by today’s president of the
SupremeCourt indicated a shift in the Court’s general attitude towards the primacy
of the legal protection of the individual as a universally recognized value. Today,
the pro persona principle is the undisputed maxim guiding Mexican judges in the
interpretation of human rights contained in the Constitution and in any treaty to
whichMexico is party. Moreover, the Supreme Court is expanding the scope of this
principle of interpretation to those norms related to human rights, a matter which
is to be interpreted according to the same criterion. This evolution coincides with
thefirst two termsof democratically elected presidents inMexico,making it thus in-
teresting to observe how the democratization process of the country has influenced
the judiciary’s self-perception of its own role within the sociopolitical system, and
how this has played a critical role in its interpretative practice, including of treaties.
3.3. The European Court of Justice and the interpretation of international
agreements
Another story of how domestic courts approach the issue of interpretation can be
told for the European Court of Justice (ECJ). At first sight, it may be surprising to
include the ECJ in this category. After all, the ECJ is a judicial organ of a regional
organization established by virtue of international law. It has become more and
more common, however, to regard the ECJ as being functionally equivalent to a
municipal court.131 It has to dealwith questions of international law in awaywhich
is comparable to the situation inwhich domestic courts find themselves when they
have to apply international law. Also, the ECJ has to determine the legal effects of
international agreements of the EU in the EU legal system.132
Two additional reasons stand out to justify looking at ECJ practice. First, its
judges have a different background compared to ordinary domestic judges. Only to
a limited degree can they bring their domestic legal tradition to fruition when they
decide cases. Arguably, the ECJ has developed its own interpretative culture when
131 See, among many other contributions, A. von Bogdandy, ‘Pluralism, Direct Effect and the Ultimate Say: On
the Relationship between International and Domestic Constitutional Law’, (2008) 6 ICON 397, at 399.
132 C. Eckes, ‘International Law as Law of the EU: The Role of the European Court of Justice’, in E. Cannizzaro, P.
Palchetti, and R. A.Wessel (eds.), International Law as Law of the European Union (2012), 353.
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it is dealing with EU law,133 which is a blend of the different influences upon the
court.134
Second, the jurisprudence of the ECJ with respect to international law has gone
throughvariouscycles.Traditionally the jurisprudenceof theCourthasbeenviewed
as being particularly open towards international law. Its more recent case law has
given rise to thequestionwhether theECJ isnowdoing things the ‘Europeanway’:135
thecourt’s refusal tograntUNSecurityCouncilResolutionsbinding forcewithin the
European legal order inKadi136 or the alleged transfer of its restrictive jurisprudence
on direct effect developed in the framework of GATT/WTO obligations to other
international agreements in the Intertanko decision are just two incidents which
have been identified as turning points in the Court’s case law on international
law.137
3.3.1. The Vienna rules and the distinct nature of treaties
Although the EU (and its predecessor, the EEC/EC) is party neither to the VCLT nor
to the 1986 Convention pertaining to international organizations,138 the ECJ quite
frequently refers toArticle 31of theVCLT,which it considers to represent customary
international law. Already at the outset, it should be noted, however, that there are
also important cases inwhich no such references figure – an issue towhichwe shall
turn in due course.
The ECJ first referred to the VCLT in the 1991 opinion on the creation of a special
court for a ‘European EconomicArea’ (EEA)whichwas to be established by the then
EECand itsmember states, on the onehand, and the states comprising the European
Free Trade Association (EFTA), on the other. The purpose of the agreement was to
extend the uniform rules of the EC commonmarket concerning the freemovement
of persons and goods to the EFTA countries. For disputes arising in this respect, a
new court was to be created. For the ECJ, the issue was whether the creation of this
new court would undermine its own authority.Whereas the EEA court would have
to pay due respect to the jurisprudence of the ECJ, the Court noted that
[t]he fact that the provisions of the agreement and the corresponding Community pro-
visions are identicallyworded does notmean that theymust necessarily be interpreted
identically. An international treaty is to be interpreted not only on the basis of its
wording, but also in the light of its objectives. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention . . .
stipulates in this respect that a treaty is tobe interpreted ingood faithand inaccordance
133 See N. Fennelly, ‘Legal Interpretation at the European Court of Justice’, (1997) 20 Fordham International Law
Journal 656; G. Conway, The Limits of Legal Reasoning and the European Court of Justice (2012).
134 Cf. J.W. vanRossem, ‘Interaction between EULawand International Law in the Light of Intertanko andKadi:
The Dilemma of Norms Binding theMember States but Not the EU’, (2009) 40 NYIL 183, at 195.
135 J. Klabbers, Treaty Conflict and the European Union (2009), 11; Eckes, supra note 132, at 363.
136 See G. de Bu´rca, ‘The ECJ and the International Legal Order: A Re-Evaluation’, in de Bu´rca andWeiler, supra
note 36, 105.
137 See M. Bronckers, ‘From “Direct Effect” to “Muted Dialogue”: Recent Developments in the European Courts’
Case Law on theWTO and Beyond’, (2008) 11 JIEL 885, at 894.
138 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between
International Organizations, (1987) 25 ILM 543.
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with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the light of
its object and purpose.139
The ECJ then stressed the differences between the EFTA/EEA and the EEC legal
order.Whereas the formerwouldonly create legal obligations for themember states,
the EEC was based on agreements which constitute the ‘constitutional charter of
a Community based on the rule of law’ with all the characterizing features of
supranationality, i.e. direct effect and supremacy of Community law.
It has been stressed that the remarkable feature of this opinion is the Court’s
emphasis on the object and purpose of the treaty.140 In general international law, the
reference to theobject andpurposeof the treaty is frequentlyunderstood toallow for
aprogressive, evolutive interpretationwhichpotentiallydecouples a treaty fromthe
original will of the states parties.141 For the ECJ, however, the reference to the object
and purpose of the EEA agreement served to underline the limitations of traditional
international agreements as compared to the dynamic nature of Community law.
The object and purpose of the EEA agreement is, then, if one follows the reasoning
of the ECJ, to lead to some form of integration, albeit one which does not lead down
the path to supranationality. This rhetoric of the categorical difference between the
object and purpose of the founding treaties of the EC and the EU on the one hand,
and international agreements which are governed by ‘ordinary’ international law
on the other, has since then been used consistently by the Court.142
3.3.2. Theory and practice of the Vienna Rules in the ECJ case law
Despite its recurring (though not systematic) usage of the Vienna rules, the ECJ
only explained in its 2010 Brita case why it has to apply the Vienna rules. The case
concerned the interpretation of the association agreements between the EC and
Israel and the Palestinian authorities respectively. The court held that the EC–Israel
associationagreement, ‘havingbeenconcludedby twosubjectsof international law’,
would be ‘governed by international treaty law and, more specifically, as regards its
interpretation, by the international law of treaties’.143 The court went on to state
that ‘the international law of treaties was consolidated, essentially, in the Vienna
Convention’ and that the rules laid down in it would apply to the association
agreement ‘in so far as the rules are anexpressionof general international customary
law’. This would entail that ‘[c]onsequently, the EC–Israel Association Agreement
must be interpreted in accordance with those rules’.144
The court then referred toArticle 31(1) of theViennaConvention aswell as to the
impactof ‘any relevant rulesof international lawapplicable in the relationsbetween
139 Opinion 1/91, [1991] ECR, I-6079, para. 14.
140 P. J. Kuijper, ‘The Court and the Tribunal of the EC and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’, (1998)
25 Legal Issues of European Integration 1, at 2.
141 C. Focarelli, International Law as Social Construct: The Quest for Global Justice (2012), 253; but see also R.
Kolb, Interpre´tation et cre´ation du droit international: Esquisse d’une herme´neutique juridique moderne pour le droit
international public (2006), at 530 et seq.
142 P. J. Kuijper, ‘The European Courts and the Law of Treaties: The Continuing Story’, in E. Cannizaro (ed.), The
Law of Treaties beyond the Vienna Convention (2011), 256, at 260 et seq.
143 Case C-386/08, Brita GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen, [2010] ECR I-1289, para. 39.
144 Ibid., paras. 40–41.
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theparties’.145 This reference toArticle 31(3)(c) of theVCLTbrought theCourt to the
considerationof thepacta tertiis ruleset forthinArticle34of theConvention.Thecase
revolved around the question whether Israeli customs authorities would enjoy the
competence to labelproductswhich inpartoriginated fromtheoccupiedPalestinian
territories as originating from Israel, thereby bringing them within the territorial
scope of application of the EC–Israel Association Agreement. This question was
further complicated by the fact that the parallel agreement between the EC and the
Palestinian territories also includedaprovisionon its territorial scopeof application,
indicating that this agreement was meant to cover products originating from the
West Bank and the Gaza strip.
The issue was thus to determine the relationship between the two agreements.
The German court which had referred the case to the ECJ wanted to know, among
other things,whether itwaspossible tomakean ‘electivedetermination’, i.e. to grant
preferential treatment to the goods in question in any case as they would either fall
within the scope of application of the EC–Israel agreement or within the scope of
the agreement between the EC and the Palestinian Authorities. This was rejected by
the ECJ on the basis of Article 34 of the Vienna Convention:
to interpret Article 83 of the EC–Israel Association Agreement as meaning that the
Israeli customs authorities enjoy competence in respect of goods originating in the
West Bank would be tantamount to imposing on the Palestinian customs authorities
anobligation to refrain fromexercising the competence conferredupon thembyvirtue
of the abovementioned provisions of the EC–PLO Protocol. Such an interpretation, the
effect of which would be to create an obligation for a third party without its consent,
would thus be contrary to the principle of general international law, ‘pacta tertiis nec
nocent nec prosunt’ as consolidated in Article 34 of the Vienna Convention.146
While the Court can be commended for its systematic explanation why it has
to have recourse to the international rules of interpretation, the result of their
application is somewhat stretching the scope of the pacta tertiis rule. Bymeans of the
interpretativemethodofsystemicintegration,averybroadprincipleof international
law is brought into the equation which arguably cannot justify the outcome of the
case.147 Instead, it was apparently used in order to refrain from a politically more
sensitive pronouncement on the limits of the notion of territory of Israel. Indepen-
dently of the political prudence of this decision, this case should alert us that self-
proclaimed respect for the Vienna rules of interpretation does not necessarily lead
to a convincing judicial reasoning.
It should be stressed, however, that the ECJ has emphasized in its case law that
resort to theVienna rules is not amatter of choice, but that international agreements
are actually governed by international treaty law and thus the international rules
on interpretation. This is only consequential in light of the place that agreements of
the EU occupy in its legal system. According to the long-standing jurisprudence of
145 Ibid., para. 43.
146 Ibid., para. 52.
147 Though different in many aspects, it is interesting to see how the Mexican Supreme Court also relied on
themethod of systemic integration without actually justifying its outcome in the case of the right to have a
name; see supra section 3.2.3.
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theCourt, agreements concludedunderArticle 216 of theTreaty on the Functioning
of the European Union are an ‘integral part’ of the EU legal order. They thus apply
automatically and need no act of transformation in order to produce legal effects
within the EU legal order.
3.3.3. The determination of the direct effect of treaty norms by the ECJ: between international
and domestic law
It is well known that there are exceptions to this rule. Most notably, the ECJ has
refused to accord direct effect to GATT as well as WTO law.148 In its more recent
case law, it has also made clear that decisions of the Appellate Body of the Dispute
Settlement Mechanism of the WTO are not directly enforceable in the EU legal
order.149 This is owing to the various options WTO member states have to remedy
breaches, as well as to the fact that other member states do not grant direct effect
to GATT and WTO provisions either, which is perceived by the ECJ as a lack of
reciprocity.150 In cases concerning these questions there is a conspicuous absence
of references to the Vienna rules of interpretation. Whereas, as we have seen, the
ECJ generally acknowledges the obligation to interpret international agreements
according to the rules set forth by the Vienna Convention, they are absent from
deliberations which concern the determination of direct effect of the agreements
entered into by the EU.
For our purposes, it is relevant how the ECJ determineswhether an international
agreement has direct effect within the EU legal order or not. This is regularly done
with a two-tier test which first determines whether the nature and broad logic
of an agreement speak against the granting of direct effect, and second enquires
whether the concrete provision which is to be applied is sufficiently clear, precise,
and unequivocal. One reason for the absence of references to the Vienna rules could
be that the determination of direct effect is a juridical exercise which sits at the
borderline between the international and the domestic spheres.151
The ECJ itself does not purport to measure the direct effect of international
agreements in terms of EU law, however. Its enquiry into the nature and broad logic
of the agreement and the concrete qualities of the respective individual rule rather
point towards the assumption that the ECJ is engaging in an act of interpretation
of international law when it is determining whether or not a provision has direct
effect in the EU legal order. This assumption finds confirmation in the recentATAA
case of 2011 in which the ECJ had to decide on the legality of the application of the
EU emissions trading system (ETS) to air traffic and, more precisely, the fact that
airlines fromnon-EUcountries have to submit to this scheme for the entire duration
148 Joined cases 21-24/72, International Fruit Company NV v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit, [1972] ECR 1219.
149 Joined cases C-120/06 P and C-121/06 P, FIAMM and Fabbrica Italiana Accumulatori Motocarri Montecchio
Technologies LLC et al v. Council and Commission, [2008] ECR I-6513.
150 B. I. Bonafe´, ‘Direct Effect of InternationalAgreements in theEULegalOrder:Does ItDependon theExistence
of an International Dispute Settlement Mechanism?’, in Cannizaro, Palchetti, and Wessel, supra note 132,
229, at 230.
151 See Nollkaemper, supra note 7, at 124–9.
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of their flights if they land or depart at an aerodrome in the EU.152 Here, the ECJ
noted in passing that when it has to decide on the direct effect of an international
agreement entered into by the EU in the EU’s internal legal order, this question falls
‘to be decided by the courts having jurisdiction in that matter, and in particular by
the Court of Justice, in the same manner as any question of interpretation relating
to the application of the agreement in the European Union’.153 Despite this state of
affairs, the international rules of interpretation regularly only intervene, however,
once the two-tier test has been passed.154
At the same time, it is interesting to see to what extent the nature and broad
logic of an agreement can be reconciled with the interpretative rules of the Vienna
Convention.155 Such an operation could be part of the context of a provisionwithin
the overall framework of the relevant agreement. Individual cases, however, cast
a shadow of doubt in this regard. In the 2008 Intertanko judgment, the ECJ had to
determinewhetheranECdirectiveonship-sourcedischargesofpollutingsubstances
was in contraventionof theprinciple of freedomofnavigation and innocent passage
guaranteed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),156
to which both the EU and its member states are parties.
The claimants had argued that the EC directive established stricter standards
with respect to the discharging of polluting substances than UNCLOS. In order to
determine whether the UNCLOS provisions relied upon were susceptible to direct
effect in the EU legal order, the ECJ had to determinewhether ‘the nature and broad
logic of UNCLOS, as disclosed in particular by its aim, preamble and terms, preclude
examinationof thevalidity ofCommunitymeasures in the light of its provisions’.157
In what follows, the Court emphasized the ‘main objective’ of UNCLOS, i.e. the
clarification and development of the general rules on the uses of marine areas.
UNCLOSwould generally aim to ‘strike a fair balance between the interests of States
as coastal States and the interests of States as flag States, which may conflict’.158 In
juxtaposition to this function of UNCLOS, the Court argued:
individuals are in principle not granted individual rights and freedoms by virtue of
UNCLOS. In particular, they can enjoy the freedom of navigation only if they establish
a close connection between their ship and a State which grants its nationality to the
ship and becomes the ship’s flag State.159
In essence, the Court emphasized the necessary connection between the shipowner
and the flag state. It concluded that ‘UNCLOS does not establish rules intended to
152 CaseC-366/10,Air Transport Association of America andOthers v. Secretary of State for Energy andClimate Change,
Judgment of theGrandChamber of 21December 2011, [2011] ECR-I, n.y.r.; see on this case the critical analysis
by A. Gattini, ‘Between Splendid Isolation and Tentative Imperialism: The EU’s Extension of Its Emission
Trading Scheme to International Aviation and the ECJ’s Judgment in the ATA Case’, (2012) 61 ICLQ 977.
153 Case C-366/10, para. 49.
154 See, for instance,CaseC-344/04,TheQueen on theApplication of InternationalAirTransportAssociation andOthers
v. Department for Transport, [2006] ECR I-403, para. 40.
155 Kuijper, supra note 142, at 260.
156 1982 United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea, 1833 UNTS 3.
157 Case C-308/06,TheQueen on the Application of International Association of Independent TankerOwners (Intertanko)
and Others v. Secretary of State for Transport, [2008] ECR I-4057, para. 54.
158 Ibid., para. 58.
159 Ibid., para. 59.
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apply directly and immediately to individuals and to confer upon them rights or
freedoms capable of being relied upon against States’.160 It has been noted that the
breadthof the regulations set forthbyUNCLOS is considerable and inother contexts
some of its provisions have been held to be self-executing.161 What is questionable,
in any case, is the generalizing approach the Court tookwith respect to UNCLOS. In
lightof theCourt’sfindings, itmaybewonderedwhether the ‘natureandbroad logic’
test is a suitable translation of the Vienna rules into a specific European approach
to determining the direct effect of international agreements. While it appears as if
this test can be used in a way which does not lead to conflicts with the generally
recognized rules of interpretation, it seems as if it may also be used as a flexible
tool to close the EU legal order against unwanted international influences. This
suspicion finds some confirmation in the already mentioned ATAA case of 2011.
There, the ECJ was willing to attribute direct effect to a number of provisions of the
2007 Open Skies Agreement between the EU and the United States – but only for
those provisions ‘which would not be determinative to the outcome of the case’.162
The case law that we have canvassed gives rise to a mixed picture. The ECJ is
generally willing to apply the international rules of interpretation and has referred
totheminpartsof its jurisprudence.TheBritacasehasconsolidatedtheECJapproach
in this respect as the Court has explained why it is having recourse to these rules.
At the same time, the application of the principle of systemic integration in the
Brita case appears to be a bit haphazard. In Intertanko, the sweeping discussion of the
‘nature and broad logic’ of UNCLOS raises doubts about the Court’s willingness to
make use of the international rules of interpretation when determining the direct
effect of international agreements in the EU legal order.
4. THREE JURISDICTIONS AND FOUR RECURRENT THEMES OF
TREATY INTERPRETATION
It is now time to turn to the four recurrent themes which we identified in our
introduction. In the following, we will first revisit the case law of each of the three
jurisdictions and discuss (i) whether it shows an awareness of the existence of
a distinct hermeneutical framework for the interpretation of international law, (ii)
whether therespective jurisprudence is likely tocontribute to further fragmentation
of the international legal system, (iii) whether the claim can be made that the
particular approach of interpretation followed by the respective court shows traits
of judicial imperialism, and (iv) whether the respective case lawmay give credence
to Scelle’s idea of the de´doublement fonctionnel. Subsequently, we will then engage in
a comparison between the attitudes of the three courts.
160 Ibid., para. 64.
161 See M. Mendez, ‘The Legal Effects of Community Agreements: Maximalist Treaty Enforcement and Judicial
Avoidance Techniques’, (2010) 21 EJIL 83, at 100. This was also the result arrived at by Advocate General
Kokott; see C-308/06, The Queen on the Application of International Association of Independent Tanker Owners
(Intertanko) and Others v. Secretary of State for Transport, [2008] ECR I-4057, opinion of Advocate General
Kokott, delivered on 20 November 2007, paras. 46–59.
162 Gattini, supra note 152, at 986.
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4.1. The US Supreme Court
With respect to the US Supreme Court’s treaty jurisprudence, the most salient fea-
ture is its dependency on the larger cultural–political trends prevalent in American
society at the respective time. This is not to say that the Court conceived itsmethod-
ology strategically in order to foster US foreign-policy goals. Rather, it demonstrates
that treaty jurisprudence isbutapartof the larger realmof law,which is itself a super-
structure of society; in the famous words of OliverW. Holmes, ‘the prevalent moral
and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the
prejudices that judges sharewith their fellow-men, have a gooddealmore to do than
the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed’.163 That
said, Georges Scelle’s idealistic conception of the de´doublement fonctionelle has to be
viewed with a certain reservation, at least as the US Supreme Court is concerned.
History demonstrates that courts are rarely able to sever the invisible ties that bind
them to their community and to fully assume the role of an organ of a different
legal order. This is even observable in judges in genuinely international courts, and
it must be much more so when domestic judges apply international law. However,
this has also a positive side that appears as well in our study of US case law: at times
when enthusiasm or at least a positive attitude towards international co-operation
dominates public opinion, lasting achievements can bemade, as long-standing pre-
cedents like the Charming Betsy decision demonstrate; thus, the ups and downs of
public attitude towards international law that are inevitable in a democratic society
can bemoderated to some extent.
Concerning the risk of a further fragmentation of international law, the picture
with respect to the US is mixed: at times, the Supreme Court went to great lengths
to bring its interpretation of a treaty provision in accordwith that of other domestic
courts, as in Abbott v. Abbott. At others, it rather ignored the jurisprudence of the
courts of other signatories, or even dismissed it as irrelevant – such as in Haitian
Centers. In any event, it seems that if indeed the time for a greater openness has
arrived again, it is not to be expected to takeplace through strict adherence to a set of
international rules of interpretation, but through a general awareness of the specific
nature of international agreements, and an increased respect for the jurisprudence
of the courts of other parties. It has been noted above that the US Supreme Court
hardly ever relied explicitly on the Vienna rules, and surely it repeatedly deviated
fromtheirconstraints.Arguably thisnegligencenotonly isdueto the fact that theUS
is not a party to theViennaConvention, but also reflects the deeper indifference of a
common-law judiciary to the project of creating a single authoritative international
methodology. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the court frequently relied on a
treaty’s purpose in deciding which among different possible interpretations should
be followed, a method prominently – and controversially – applied in the Abbott
case.
163 O.W. Holmes, The Common Law (1882), 1.
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4.2. TheMexican Supreme Court
Our discussion of the development of treaty interpretation by Mexican courts con-
firms the finding from the US example that also questions of method and interpret-
ative approach are largely dependent on political and social conditions. In Latin
America, ‘fragmented’ political systems – as opposed to unitary systems built and
functioning around an authoritarian executive – tend to set the conditions for the
activedevelopmentof the judiciary.164 It is thereforeno surprise thatMexican judges
and the SupremeCourt in particular started to assume their proper role as a separate
power once the democratization of the country began to materialize. This change
of attitude is especially visible in contested cases of a certain political relevance
where the importance of interpretation becomes more apparent. But beyond this
and apart from strictly technical matters, international law tends to demand per
se a new amount of autonomy from judges who were accustomed to regard the
external sphere as the exclusive terrain of sovereigns embodied by their respective
executives. This helps to explain why in matters of treaty interpretation the Mex-
ican Supreme Court has moved from being a distant observer confined to formal
requirements of treaty law, to embracing amore significant role concernedwith the
treaties’ normative contents.
Thisputs international law inadifferentperspective forMexico’s top judges.Now
that theCourtfindsitselfcalledupontoclarifywhat ‘the internationalcommitments
of Mexico’ mean and to determine how they matter in and to Mexico, its function
as agent of the state acquires a dimension which goes far beyond the aspect of
avoidingtriggeringstate responsibility.TheMexicanCourt isdiscoveringthatgiving
meaning to these commitments is a furthermeansof augmenting itspositionwithin
the national political system: treaty interpretation fulfils a judicial emancipatory
function in Mexico’s young democracy. This function is further strengthened if
accompanied by transnational judicial actors. Becoming an ‘agent of international
law’ is best understood in the present context as forming part of a transnational
coalition of judges pursuing similar goals.165 The Inter-American human rights
regime offers the natural frame to which Mexican judges can attach, and they are
doing so, especially since the human rights reform of June 2011. Just as informal
judicial coalitions have been acknowledged to perform an important function in
relation to abuses of executive powers in several states in the framework of the
international fight against terrorism,166 it is possible to regard the growing judicial
dialogue inLatinAmerica as a co-ordinated response to authoritarian reminiscences
in an effort to maintain and strengthen judicial checks and balances domestically.
Thus, although some do read the recent emphasis on the pro persona principle
and the controˆle de conventionalite´ as an expression of the de´doublement fonctionnel
164 Navia and Rı´os Figueroa, supra note 81, at 196.
165 A tendency which is also reflected in the recent attention that the literature on transnational judicial co-
operation has received byMexican constitutionalists; see, e.g., S. M. Serna de la Garza, Impacto e Implicaciones
Constitucionales de la Globalizacio´n en el Sistema Jurı´dico Mexicano (2012).
166 See Benvenisti, supra note 2.
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thesis,wherebynational judgeswould act as agents of the Inter-American system,167
this new interpretative approach by the Mexican Supreme Court, which does not
follow the classical divide between thenational and international legal orders, is too
unidirectional to give account of the split of personality such a thesis presupposes,
at least in Scelle’s version.
There is nothing novel in national courts using international law for internal
purposes, and if the (interpretative) means of doing this coincide with a broader,
almost regional judicial attitude framed in the universal language of human rights
law then one might think that Mexican courts and tribunals are indeed doing a
service in favour of the unity of the international legal order. International human
rights law is, nodoubt, akeycomponentof anyeffort tobring someconstitutionality
into international law.Enforcinghumanrights,hereandthere,doesat theendfortify
the common frame of reference. But the pro persona principle has the potential for
inflation; every norm can be seen through the lenses of human rights under this
method. Disregarding other applicable norms of international law, or engaging in
such broad and loose interpretative exercises of treaty norms that hardly could re-
connect to other judicial bodies not operating in the pro persona mood, certainly
has a theoretical potential of furthering fragmentation at the international level.
However, as already stated above, such judicial performances would rather fall into
oblivion. Far more problematic is the effect they could have on human rights law
itself. The risk of overstretching this regime is real, and a too extensive use of the pro
persona principle may backfire.
It is in this regard that amore equilibrated recourse to questions ofmethod could
be useful forMexican courts. For one reason or an other,Mexican judges do not tend
to use theVienna ‘crucible’, and have so far preferred to use the different ingredients
of Article 31 (and Article 32) separately. A more nuanced hermeneutical approach
would offer multiple paths to connect with the plurality of actors the Mexican
Supreme Court has to address today, both internally and externally.
4.3. The European Court of Justice
Despite the different institutional position of the ECJ as the court of a regional
system of integration, its approach to treaty interpretation is characterized by some
similarities to the US andMexican examples. The case law of the ECJ shows clearly
that this court is aware of the existence of a distinct hermeneutical framework
for treaty interpretation. This does not prevent the Court, however, from reasoning
withinthis frameworkonly insomecases inwhichquestionsof treaty interpretation
areat stake.Aswehaveseen, themost importantexceptioninthis sense is theCourt’s
case lawon thedeterminationof direct effect of international agreements.Although
there are indications in the Court’s case law that the ECJ also understands this
exercise as one of treaty interpretation, a special two-tier test is deployedwhich first
analyses the nature and broad logic of the respective agreement before the Vienna
rules on treaty interpretation intervene. While it is theoretically conceivable that
167 See S. Garcı´a Ramı´rez and M. I. Del Toro Huerta, Me´xico ante la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos,
Decisiones y Transformaciones (2011), 218.
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this analysis of the nature and broad logic of an international agreement could
be carried out following the Vienna rules, the practice of the ECJ does not follow
these paths. Rather, as the Intertanko case shows, the court is more inclined to make
generalizing conclusions about the nature of an international agreement which
would be hard to arrive at if the Court followed the means of interpretation as set
forth by Articles 31 and 32 VCLT.
With this pick-and-choose attitude, the case law of the ECJmight also contribute
to further fragmentation. As a powerful actor watched closely by other courts and
tribunals, it could set a negative example for other courts. TheCourt, however, is not
purporting to set forth a particular vision of treaty interpretation which it expects
other domestic courts to follow. This at least could save the ECJ from charges of
judicial imperialism. Rather, the ECJ’s approach to treaty interpretation appears to
followthesamelogicwhichhasbeendiagnosedingeneralwithrespect tothiscourt’s
attitude topublic international law: friendlyandwelcoming ingeneral, but insisting
on the autonomy of the EU legal system vis-a`-vis traditional forms of international
lawwhen the really important issues are at stake.
The ECJ’s case law pertaining to the interpretation of international treaties is
clear, however, in so far as it shows the institutional loyalties of the Court. By not
applying the Vienna rules precisely in the controversial domain of determining
direct effect – arguably the most important task of treaty interpretation for the ECJ
– it is implicitly showing that it has no institutional philosophy of de´doublement
fonctionnel. On this point the ECJ is very clear: it is the guardian of a new legal order
which is different from international law. It might be the precarious independence
of EU law from international law which makes the case law of the ECJ so categoric
in this regard.
4.4. The recurrent themes compared: concluding remarks
Analysing the above, we can identify both similarities and differences between
the three jurisdictions. With respect to the awareness of the distinct international
hermeneutical framework, the US Supreme Court is a special case in so far as its
jurisprudence does not even try to engage with the Vienna rules of interpretation
– certainly also due to the fact that the US is not party to the Vienna Convention,
although the rules of interpretation are widely regarded as reflecting customary
international law. In comparison, the case law of the Mexican and EU courts shows
that theyaregenerallywellawareof theexistenceof theViennarulesandare readyto
apply them inat least somecases, thoughnot always in amannerwhich is faithful to
the underlying principles of these rules. Accordingly, the three case studies point to
more diversitywith respect to the approachof domestic courts towards the question
of treaty interpretation than is usually acknowledged.168
Whether this plurality of approaches leads to further fragmentation remains an
open question. The diversity of the practice of domestic courts certainly does not
support the claim and aspiration for international law to provide a unitary set of
168 Cf. van Alstine, supra note 42.
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secondary rules to which the rules of interpretation belong. The three case studies
all point to the importance of political and social factors impacting on the case
law of the courts, be it in the forms of varying degrees of openness towards the
international in theUSSupremeCourt, the role of international law in theprocesses
of emancipation from a previous authoritarian regime in Mexico, or the desire of
the European Court of Justice to strengthen the autonomy of the EU legal order
against traditional forms of international law. As applied by these domestic courts,
the rules of interpretation do not retain a quality of perfectly neutral and objective
rules which are immune from political power struggles. Rather, they are exposed to
these struggles to thesameextentas thesubstantive ruleswhichneed interpretation.
This is not necessarily good news for the claim that the growing role of domestic
courts is set to strengthen the international rule of law. It somewhat reduces the
impact that judgments from domestic courts will have on the future development
of international law. At least, the absence of consistent application of the Vienna
rules of interpretation makes it more difficult for other courts and tribunals – be
they international or domestic – tofind inspiration in thedomestic case lawwehave
analysed.
Our three case studies give rise to doubts about the argument that this growing
role of domestic courts is evidence for a renewed practical relevance of Georges
Scelle’s notion of the de´doublement fonctionnel. International law might conceivably
harbouracertainexpectationinthis regard, i.e. that itaspires tomakeuseofdomestic
courts as a substitute for its own lack of a central enforcement machinery.169 But
fromtheperspectiveof domestic courts, the institutional loyalties appear tobe clear.
The case studies we have examined show that the respective courts have their own
agendas, inspired by the political and social conditions relevant for their domestic,
and sometimes regional, audiences. Recourse to the Vienna rules of interpretation
might have indicated a sense of loyalty towards the international legal order. The
absence of such recourse, or the diverse and fragmented use of the international
rules of interpretation, cautions against unrealistic assertions of domestic courts as
organs of the international community.
Finally,however,all thisneednotbeevidenceofnewformsofjudicial imperialism.
With respect to the use of the rules of treaty interpretation, the practices of the three
courts do not betray aspirations to become role models for other courts to follow.
A special case in this regard is the Mexican Supreme Court, which has recently
developed the judicial policy of making the widest possible use of the pro persona
principle. This judicial strategy is inspired by a broader regional tendency, but
primarily geared toward domestic tribunals. Perhaps it would be too much to say
that it represents a new form of domestic judicial imperialism, but it certainly
carries the risk of alienating the domestic judicial system. The US Supreme Court,
in comparison, does not aspire to set forth a particular role model with its canons
of treaty construction. It just follows its own tradition and, maybe also because of
its own scepticism towards judicial dialogue, does not appear to expect that other
169 See further A. Tzanakopoulos, ‘Domestic Courts in International Law: The International Judicial Function
of National Courts’, (2011) 34 Loyola L.A. International and Comparative Law Review 153.
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domestic courts will follow its own example. The ECJ, finally, may in this regard
be too much of a special case. While its concern to safeguard the autonomy of
its own legal order may be read as just another variant of traditional and well-
known debates about the relationships between the international and domestic
legal systems, its institutional peculiarities may prevent other courts from directly
following its approaches to treaty interpretation.
Domesticcourts fromother jurisdictionswehavenotexaminedinthisarticlemay
be more faithful to the international rules of interpretation. For this contribution,
however, we did not want to select the easy cases. Rather, it was our goal to unearth
the diversity in the practice of domestic courts – a diversity which is all too quickly
negated in the interests of letting international law appear more integrated than
it actually is. In the light of the case law we have analysed, uniformity in treaty
interpretationisstill faraway–ifachievableanddesirableatall.However, thisshould
nothinderdomestic courts,when facedwithquestionsof treaty interpretation, from
pondering whether or not their jurisprudence should allow for a certain degree of
systemic unity of the international legal system, which in turn facilitates judicial
dialogue and cross-fertilization of their respective approaches. The Vienna rules
of interpretation would be a valuable device in this regard – not much more but
nothing less. It is for domestic courts to decide whether – and, if so, how – to make
use of them.
